Obama outplayed: France moves in

Over the last two years, the world has entered a new phase in its history which is much more unstable than before. Various major players are competing to fill the gap left by Obama's idealistic and isolationist approach. One of these is the Islamic State (IS). The attack on Friday 13 November 2015 in Paris has activated the French to lead the effort against IS as well as stabilizing the balance-of-power in the Syrian conflict after Russia became militarily involved.

With the IS attack in Paris on Friday 13 November 2015, the peoples of the Western world were rudely awakened to the reality that they have entered a totally new world. This was not merely a spectacular attack by a distant enemy; it signalled a new phase in the international political landscape. The old world - which was (for the most part) stable, peaceful, prosperous and largely predictable (except for so-called "failed states" at the edge of civilization), has changed in less than two years into one that is exactly the opposite, namely unstable, full of conflict, insecure and very unpredictable. And this is not yet the full extent of what can be expected. If history is our guide, we can expect that this new multi-polar world would go through a period of intense upheaval and conflict before the waters calm down again.

Less than two years ago, on 2 February 2014, I wrote that we are entering a new phase in world history in which the stable political landscape that we knew for decades has begun to disintegrate. That was before Russia invaded the Crimea in Ukraine and before ISIL became a major player. I wrote: "Although the world is not yet in the precarious situation of being unstable, it is changing fast and the signs are clear that a new phase in the political history of the world has begun. There is a sense that the playing field has opened up and that opportunities are presenting themselves. The other important players (other than the US) sense that the Great Recession has damaged the financial power of the West and with it its ability to project power. And they are preparing strategies to assert themselves in ways unthinkable a few years ago." [1]

One of the main reasons for this dramatic change is the position of the Obama administration. US President Obama's foreign policy can be summarized in two motto's: 1) Work towards enforcing a rule-based international order with negotiation as the basic tool 2) Use military force with extreme caution and then only hesitatingly when there is overwhelming pressure to do so (that is, excluding the US drone program). This is exactly the opposite of the Bush-doctrine. With this unilateral idealist and isolationist approach, the US has effectively created a wide-open geopolitical space (especially in the Middle East) in which many powerful role-players are competing for power and influence.

It is in this political space that Russia, Iran, China, IS and now also France and its EU partners are stepping into. The enemies of the West know that this window of opportunity might close when Obama leaves the White House. And they are moving fast. As the only Western power willing to confront this situation, France is becoming an important champion of Western interests in this new world - taking up a role which has for decades been reserved for the US as the leader of the Western world.

The major players in the new geopolitical power-game

All the major powers have made significant geopolitical moves over the last two years. The first substantial move in this regard was a Russian one: On 27 February 2014, Russia occupied the Crimea which belonged to Ukraine. In this context, the Russians introduced a new method of war, namely the "hybrid war" which involves many aspects which are designed to mislead the enemy. Then, at the beginning of March 2014, Russia instigated insurrections with eventual Russian military support in the Donbas areas of eastern Ukraine. On 30 September 2015 Russia also became militarily involved in the conflict in Syria. In all these cases the Russians have acted to secure their own geopolitical interests, especially their ability to project power beyond their immediate homeland (from their naval bases in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol and the Syrian port city of Tartus).

Other important players followed the Russian example. Since 2014 China began to aggressively extend its control in the South China Sea (which it claims as its own), turning seven reefs into artificial islands. In less than two years China has reclaimed more than eight square kilometres (ninety football fields), building three airstrips. As with the Russian actions, the speed and scale of this undertaking have surprised all the other players in the region. Since the beginning of 2015, Iran has also dramatically increased its tactical and military support for its allies: the Assad regime, Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shiites and the Houthis in Yemen (see [2] for a detailed discussion). There are more than a thousand Iranian soldiers fighting alongside Assad's forces and Iranian warplanes accompany Russian bombers over the Syrian skies. In Yemen, Iran's covert involvement in support of the Houthis prompted Saudi-Arabia to lead a nine-nation coalition in a military campaign to stop the spread of the Iranian influence in their neighbourhood.

Iranian warplanes accompanying Russian bombers over Syria

The projections of power by these major players stretch from Ukraine, through the Middle East to the South China Sea. In all these areas they (Russia-Iran-China, which might have entered into a secret military alliance) are trying to expand their geopolitical position at the expense of other countries which belong to the Western sphere of influence. These conflicting interests are especially intense in the context of the Syrian Civil War. The reason for this is simple: if the Syrian rebellion is successful, Russia would lose its last footprint in the Middle East and Iran's influence in the Middle East would decrease dramatically. This is why I said shortly after the outbreak of the Syrian rebellion in 2011 in the context of the Arab Spring that the conflict would escalate to involve other countries due to the fact that Russia would stand with the Assad regime [3]. Now many countries are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. On the one hand, there are Russia, Iran, Hezbollah; to counter their influence the US (CIA), Saudi-Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and others have started training moderate (and not-so-moderate) rebel groups who fight against the Assad regime and provide them with weaponry.

Another group that has been able to dramatically increase their projection of power on the world stage is the Islamic State (IS). Before 2014, ISIL (the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant), as it was known since April 2013 when the Islamic State of Iraq merged with the Al-Nuzra Front (the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda), was just one of many military groups active in the Syrian conflict. But then, on 29 June 2014, they declared a world-wide caliphate and began a very aggressive effort towards territorial expansion which led to control over a large area stretching from Aleppo in Syria to the heartlands of central Iraq. Since then, satellite IS groups have been formed in Libya, Yemen, Egypt (in the Sinai Peninsula), Saudi-Arabia, Algeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Northern Caucasus and other countries. Over the last few weeks, they have claimed responsibility for attacks in Turkey, Yemen, Lebanon, the downing of a Russian passenger plane over the Sinai and the Paris attacks. 

The rise of IS is directly related to the power-game involving the other major players. Since the legal grounds for involvement on the side of the rebels in the Syrian conflict is restricted according to the principle of non-interference in a sovereign country without UN agreement, the existence of IS in that geographical area provides an entry point into that conflict without direct involvement against the Assad regime. As such, countries like the US who strongly support a rule-based international order (for example, against Russia's engagement in Ukraine), could establish a physical military presence in the area without directly engaging the Syrian regime - which would be important in case the Syrian Civil War evolves into a major war. The fight against IS provides various countries with a cover to promote their interests in the Syrian Civil War: the US, Turkey, Saudi-Arabia and Qatar assist the rebel groups whereas Russia bombs Assad's enemies (during the first stage of their bombing campaign, 90% of their targets were other Syrian rebel groups than IS, some of which are supported by the US). 

The very existence of IS is in the interest of certain countries. In general, the geographical area that IS controls in Iraq and Syria effectively forms a buffer zone against Iran's military expansion in the region. This suits Sunni governments like Saudi-Arabia and Turkey well. Then, the fight against IS may also provide dictatorial regimes like that of Egyptian President Sisi and leaders with such tendencies like Turkish president Erdogan with excuses to eliminate or subdue their political opponents (Turkey's initial leniency towards IS was the reason why its conflict with the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) flared up again - PKK cadres attacked security forces whom they believed allowed IS to plant bombs in Kurdish areas). Previously, in the fight against Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani military also secretly supported affiliated Islamist militants, which led to a low-point in its relations with the US. 

The main reason why countries like Russia, Iran, China and IS have been able to dramatically increase their geopolitical footprint over the last two years, is that they understood that the unilateral focus of the Obama administration on an idealist approach to world events, with an accompanying aversion in a realist approach which focuses on geopolitical concerns, has created an enormous geopolitical space which other strong players can occupy without serious consequences. Even Obama recognized this when he made a humiliating policy reversal in June 2014, ordering US troops back to Iraq.

Of special concern for the West (apart from the IS threat) is Russia's involvement in Syria which has dramatically disrupted the balance of power in the Syrian conflict. And the hands of the US are tied due to the Obama approach. Even in the face of the about 250 000 war dead, most of which are civilians of which about 90% have been killed by Assad's indiscriminate bombing! Then there is the Iran-factor. The lifting of sanctions against Iran early in 2016 (in accordance with the negotiated agreement with the P5+1 to dismantle their nuclear capacity) would release up to $100 billion to that country, which is of great concern for its opponents in the Middle East, especially Israel and Saudi-Arabia.

France enters the game

Until the 13 November 2015 attack in Paris, the French involvement in the Syrian conflict was quite moderate. The reason for this is that France, with all the Western countries, accepted the leadership role of the US in such matters. This has now changed. France is the only other Western country with the ability to step into the gap that the US has left on the Near Eastern scene. They are the only major player that can come to the rescue of Western interests in the Middle East. (Britain, which has previously been a major military player, has recently become a very untrustworthy partner in this regard). France is a staunch supporter of the moderate Syrian rebels and is one of a few countries (including the US and Britain) who recognize the Turkey-based Syrian National Council (SNC) as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people in the context of the Syrian Civil War.

There can be no doubt that the 13 November 2015 attack in Paris has galvanized the French in a manner very similar to that in which the 11 September 2001 attack activated the US into action against Al-Qaeda. Comparisons have been made between the speeches given by George W. Bush and Francois Hollande after the attacks as well as the wording of the resolutions tabled shortly afterwards at the UN security council. The response of the US was primarily a military one - they activated article 5 for the first time in NATO's history. The French responded differently: they activated the collective defence article 42.7 in the EU's Lisbon treaty. Although France has a lot of experience in such matters - they were recently militarily involved in stabilizing both the Central African Republic as well as Mali, where they fought with the government against Islamist militants (the attack on the luxury Radisson Blu Hotel in Mali's capital Bamako which came shortly after the Paris attack, might have been an effort to discredit the French involvement there and make it harder to reach its goal in the Syrian context) - they previously struggled to get the rest of the EU on board with them. 

The French approach is much more sophisticated than that of the US. Whereas the US has struggled to develop a coherent approach - they either have too much focus on military involvement or too little; they have either a too unilateral approach (only in the framework of NATO) or tried to merely train and support local partners (without any direct combat involvement) - the French have been able to combine all of these, namely local partners, restricted "boots on the ground" and a good balance between diplomatic and military engagement. The refugee crisis recently forced other EU countries like Germany too also contemplate deeper involvement - even with a military dimension - in unstable regions in its neighbourhood. We might in future see that the EU develops a more substantial coordinated military approach to secure its own backyard. Such an approach would combine the soft power for which the EU is known, with the restricted use of hard power.

The UN resolution that the French tabled after the Paris attack, which was accepted on 20 November 2015, may provide the legal framework not merely for more intensive involvement against IS, but also more generally in Syria. The reason is that the permission of the Assad regime is not required for such intervention, which calls "upon member states that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures ... on the territory under the control of ISIL ... in Syria and Iraq." This may allow the anti-Assad forces led by France and the US to establish boots on the ground in Syria (at first only special forces). At the same time, France would try to restrict the Russian attacks on the moderate opposition by involving them in some manner in the fight against IS (the US and its EU partners are also actively trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, which would isolate Iran in its support for Syrian President Assad).

The resolution also targets the Al-Nusra Front which has broken ranks with IS. This may allow countries that back the Syrian rebels to more openly do so, also with air support (ostensibly in their fight against both IS and Al-Nusra) - which would necessarily also mean that they are better equipped to fight the Assad-regime. On the other hand, the resolution may allow Russia and Iran to target those Islamist groups supported by Saudi-Arabia and Qatar that fights alongside Al-Nusra. The outcome may be an escalation in the Syrian conflict, which in turn may lead to a full-blown proxy war between the two opposing alliances - especially when the IS threat is reduced in the area.

In my view, the Syrian conflict may eventually escalate into another major war (see [4]). At this stage, there are renewed efforts to kick-start a negotiated transition process but the main stumbling block, namely the future role of Syrian President Assad, has not been removed. Although there is currently a lot of talk about a grand coalition against IS, the fault-line between the opponents and supporters of the Assad regime, between the Sunni-countries led by Saudi-Arabia and Shiite Iran, between the Western-backed alliance and Russia-Iran-Assad alliance, may become more accentuated once IS has been degraded to a more manageable threat.  

For now, France has found a way to stabilize the balance-of-power in the Syrian conflict but when the sanctions against Iran are lifted in 2016, the conflict may intensify further. Although IS may pose a threat for decades to come, its ability to strike again in the EU has already been severely restricted through a substantial upgrading of the Schengen zone in the EU as well as improved information-intelligence sharing between EU countries (some even speak of the eventual formation of an EU intelligence agency).

Conclusion

Over the last two years, our world has become a very unstable place where major players compete in the geopolitical space created by the Obama doctrine. As such IS is just one such player and it would be wrong to think that this common threat would bring about a substantial alliance between all the other role players. Although IS is definitely a major threat to the stability of the world, the larger geopolitical game poses an even greater threat - namely that of a major war, even another world war. Again, it would be wrong to see the actions of France after the attack in Paris merely in the context of IS; rather, the acceptance of the UN resolution that France tabled, actually allows the various players in the Syrian conflict to more openly support the opposing groups. Whereas the military involvement of Russia in the Syrian conflict has upset the balance-of-power in that conflict, the French actions may allow the Western nations to effectively counter the Russian actions.

In my view, the dramatic escalation of instability on the world scene over the last two years is only the beginning. As I previously suggested from my geopolitical analysis of world events [1], we are entering another phase in world history - a war phase, that will bring enormous upheaval. In the same manner that the Vietnam War gradually escalated into a major war, I foresee that the same could happen in the Syrian conflict. Russia, Iran and China might try to maximize their geopolitical gains before president Obama depart; he would leave it to his successor in the White House to clean up his mess. 

[1] Click on The pursuit of geopolitical power in an emerging multi-polar world
[2] Click on A New Iranian Empire is rising
[3] On 5 December 2011. Oorlogswolke begin oor die Midde Ooste saampak.
[4] Click on Is A Third World War Brewing?

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

Postmodernism faces its first great challenge

Postmodernism seems to have become the dominant contemporary paradigm governing Western thought. I use the events in Ukraine to show that postmodernism is facing its first real challenge - on the political front. I ask: What will come of this?

Over the last century, postmodernism has slowly but steadily grown to become what is probably the most important paradigm governing Western thought. At first, it was only an idea, a philosophical idea. But with time postmodernism has seemingly become the dominant paradigm in Western thinking which pervaded not only the arts and literature but most areas of academic research and life: psychology, politics, theology and even the some of the sciences. There are some scientists in the natural sciences who still cling to the modernist paradigm, but even in the philosophy of those sciences, the boat has departed to different shores (although not necessarily postmodernism).

In the public and political space, postmodernism seems to govern the thinking of the world's most important leaders and a very large part of the main media outlets. The EU is a paradigmatic example where postmodernism governs the thinking of the elite. The same is true of Barack Obama's administration. The new manner of thinking says that all narratives are fine, all have a valid point, no standpoint is to be excluded, peace should reign, all are even. This paradigm thinks of itself as representing an all-inclusive package, where all views in its otherness find acceptance in an open space of reconciliation and accommodation (except maybe those which degrade our humanity in a substantial way).

Often challenges for such paradigms arrive in the political arena. This is where the practical implications of ideas and paradigms become visible. As such, the Kremlin's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine presents a direct and substantial challenge to postmodernism. It is not merely that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, rejects the postmodern paradigm and tries to present an alternative (a nationalist-traditionalist perspective). It is rather that he presents a part of reality which is not included in the postmodern paradigm. And this poses the first real challenge to postmodernism. The question is: How will these events impact on postmodern thinking?

Postmodernism and reality

As with all powerful paradigms, postmodernism became part and parcel of Western thinking over a long period of time. As its name suggests, the idea behind it originally developed in reaction against the modernist paradigm which ruled the Western world from the Enlightenment into the early twentieth century. The thinker who can in my view be regarded as the father of postmodernism is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). He was the first philosopher who radically challenged modernism, and with it, the long rationalist tradition going back to Socrates. To some extent, however, his philosophy should rather be viewed merely as anti-modernist.

Although various great names, such as Sigmund Freud, took a lot from Nietzsche's thinking, it was the French philosophers Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924-1998), Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and others who formulated the ideas which took the name postmodernism and which became the paradigm of thinking all over the West (and even wider). Some philosophers, like Richard Rorty (1931-2007) with his easy style of writing, was influential in getting the ideas out to the American public and others around the world.

Postmodern thinkers staged an effective reaction against modernism in levelling severe criticism against it. The greatest reason for modernism's eventual fall, however, was that it showed serious discrepancy with practical reality. In the era when the sciences became established, it seemed so natural and logical to think that one would always be able to obtain a final objective view of things. Is science not exactly the pursuit of such final truths? Final truths which show for once and for all what reality is like?

Already in Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) philosophy, who is often viewed as the paradigmatic modernist thinker (that distinction rather belongs to René Descartes (1596-1650)), it is clear that although we can obtain "objectivity" to the extent that we as humans share the same type (forms) of understanding as well as the same world, both our reason as well as our access to the world are restricted. This means that we do not have a God's eye view from which we can make final judgments - all our judgments are made from our restricted human standpoint (this is captured in the famous "Copernican turn" in his philosophy). Even in the natural sciences, for example, in quantum mechanics, we cannot do better than allowing for various interpretations.

The disconnect between paradigms arising from great ideas, and reality, is well-attested in the history of such paradigms. Take Marxism, for example. For many, it seemed like the final social answer to the class-divided world. Many great Western thinkers were Marxists. But when it was implemented in practice in Communist countries all over the world, it failed miserably. With the collapse of the Soviet-Union, Marxism effectively also ceased to be a viable paradigm.

The events in Ukraine brings postmodernism at the same crossroads. Again, as with so many older paradigms, it does not seem to fit reality. The reason is simple: Putin represents a view which sets itself apart from the postmodern paradigm. This demonstrates that at least some views are not only not-included in postmodernism; these views are in conflict with the basic perspectives guiding postmodernism. On the surface, postmodernism seems to be exceptionally accommodating, but in practice, it cannot include views which assert their own correctness against postmodernism.

Putin thinks in geopolitical terms - and the expansion of the EU, with its postmodernist paradigm, presents a do-or-die moment for him. The expansion of the EU strangles the Russian sphere of influence. It says: join us or join us. There is not any allowance for Russian geopolitical concerns, which view the EU-expansion (and its ideas) as "life" threatening. Putin represents that part of reality which stands outside the postmodern paradigm and its political goals; that part of reality which is not included in the postmodernist paradigm.

Postmodernist thinkers will not see it in these terms. They view Putin's stance as out of line with contemporary thought. They believe that Putin holds fast to outdated ideas. They believe that Russia - and the world - will eventually come around and see that postmodernism is in fact correct. If the present conflict escalates into a full-blown (cold)war, they would view the Western perspective as one worth fighting for. And if the West prevails, they would believe that such a victory demonstrates the triumph of postmodernism on the political front. It will be taken as evidence for the success of postmodernism itself.

Postmodernism as ideology

One of the typical problems with the implementation of ideas and the establishment of paradigms is that it reveals underlying problems that would otherwise remain hidden. It shows what are the defects of such generally accepted paradigms. And as I argued above, the general defect of paradigms is that they, in general, exclude some aspect of reality. Since we only have a human perspective, it is impossible to obtain final proof to demonstrate that some paradigm is the only valid one (that was the main idea behind modernism!).

Often those situated in some paradigm are blind to such defects and try to enforce their paradigm as the only correct and acceptable one. Then the problem is not merely that the adherents of the paradigm regard it as the only valid view (many competing paradigms can hold to that), but that they do not allow for any discontent. At this point, the paradigm becomes an ideology. In the case of Marxism, the ideological implementation led to dictatorship and total control over peoples lives. It led to the suppression of all freedom. And this is generally true of all paradigms which become ideologies and which come in control of the resources and means to enforce implementation.

Postmodernism represents a very large house in which many and diverse alternative viewpoints have been accommodated. It presents a unity in diversity, but not a unity which includes all diversity. Since it represents mainly "alternative" viewpoints which have traditionally been excluded from mainstream thinking, it also presents an alternative to traditional viewpoints. But the alternative which is presented does not have space for those traditional views. This is the part of reality which it can never incorporate. Although postmodernism professes to accept all narratives as having validity, the peace which it preaches can only be realized when their viewpoint becomes the final one - undisputed and taken as the only correct one.

To achieve this goal, postmodernist advocates are in a total war against its opposition: to discredit, undermine and exclude it as far as possible. Its sense of reconciliation has very definite limits: there is no place for alternative paradigms, like that of traditional Christianity, who rejects "alternative" world-views and lifestyles as undermining the basic foundations of healthy family life. In fact, it preys on broken and dismembered family members who are (largely because of the modernist paradigm) disillusioned with traditional thinking. These advocates are involved in an all-out war of ideas. Since they are in alliance with the contemporary political elite, they are in near-control of the mind-forming media. One can expect that at some point in future they will also start to reinforce their paradigm as the only acceptable one.

The partnership between postmodernism and the political elite in the EU and (partially) the US can eventually lead to exactly this outcome. We already see that postmodernism has become an ideology which is enforced through "political correctness". Journalists who are not careful to stay in line with politically correct thinking will soon find themselves out of work. Books which do not toe the line, will not be published in the mainstream press. One can think that the EU, where postmodernism is in every respect the unofficially accepted paradigm, would eventually as it grows in power also start to enforce this ideology not only in the media but even beyond that. When it becomes the enforced norm, freedom of thinking will be sacrificed. The question is maybe not whether, but when, the EU will eventually proceed along this road?

What is the alternative?

Some philosophers seem to be stuck in the modernist-postmodernist dichotomy. They think in either-or terms. But are these real opposites or are they merely opposing paradigms? Are there any other roads - even they are less travelled? There are in fact such alternatives. An important alternative is the one presented by Kant, namely the "transcendental idea" (as I call his basic philosophical idea). One cannot really call it a paradigm because it has never developed into a generally accepted paradigm, in spite of the enormous impact that Kant's thought had on Western philosophy. The main reason for this is that for most of the past two hundred years Kantian studies was dominated by the two-object view which supposedly finds all sorts of inconsistencies in Kant's philosophy. Over the last half-century, there has, however, been a dramatic repositioning in Kantian thought with the general acceptance of the two-aspect view.

According to the transcendental idea, there are ideas (say, scientific theories) which fit our observation of reality, but only within certain constraints. We can obtain a good fit between our conceptual structure and the external world around us given in perception. We can, however, never achieve a fit between our ideas and the world as it really is outside those constraints. The fit between ideas or paradigms and reality can, therefore, never be final. One often finds opposing paradigms which are dogmatically asserted by their proponents, but which do not capture reality as it really is - and which effectively "says too much" about the world. They affirm things that cannot be proven.

Modernism and postmodernism can be viewed as such opposing paradigms. Although postmodernism has brought a very effective criticism against modernism, the same can be done regarding postmodernism. In both cases, the paradigm says more than it should: Modernism believed we can obtain one final and objective truth, postmodernism believes that all possible truths are included in its truth. In fact, both these extremes are too restricted to capture the whole truth - or the world as it really is.

Kant showed that we can bring such opposites into conflict and in that way discover solutions which, although they cannot be proven to be true, may, in fact, be true. In this way, we create space for various valid possibilities. In fact, one of the most important outcomes of the conflicting positions discussed by Kant is the possibility of saving "freedom". We can, in general, take this as the free space in which paradigms compete. Such a space allows all possible paradigms to freely compete in the marketplace of ideas. Viable ideas would present themselves as worthy competitors. When this space is restricted, it is a typical sign that the adherents of that paradigm who do this, do not have confidence that their own view would be able to survive the open competition.

In the market space of ideas, rational discussion and practical demonstration should freely compete. And those ideas which are better would carry the day - if this space is not loaded to favour one over the other. Although absolute freedom is obviously not obtainable (there are always certain paradigmatic structures embedded in a society which developed over many years), this space should involve freedom to promote one's views without being persecuted (there are obviously certain limits to this, for example, child pornography etc.). Although we can respect all views (or maybe rather the persons holding those views), this does not mean they are all worthy of our consideration. We can at the same time argue that some are better and even that one is correct - even though we, from a human perspective, would never be in a position to prove that in a final sense.

The problem with the present situation is that this space is severely restricted by the congruence between postmodernism and the Western political elite. Only those ideas which are in line with postmodern thought are accepted and allowed in the public media. Only certain viewpoints are heard on TV, on radio and in the main newspapers. When the traditional viewpoint is presented, it is often not by sufficiently accomplished persons and it is always attacked vehemently by the proponents of postmodernism. Often a caricature is made out of it. What we see is not a free space for ideas (although the main newspapers would often say that it is!), it is rather a war zone where the postmodern ideologists try to gain as much field as possible.

In my opinion, the present conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that postmodernism is not all-inclusive and can never be. The fact that this conflict between the West and Russia is also cast in ideological terms in the mainstream media (especially in the EU) could eventually lead to a perceived victory for postmodernism if the West win in any future escalation of the conflict. This can strengthen the ideological impulse in postmodernism circles leading to even stronger enforcement of its view.

At some point along the way, freedom can give way to effective dictatorship, although under a different name. Then their enemies would be cast in the role of enemies of reconciliation and accommodation. Since the postmodernist house is so large, it could easily lay claim to the whole space, and try to eliminate all who reject this paradigm. Since traditional Christians would surely find themselves on the outside, their breathing space could become extremely small. Although this would exhibit the failure of postmodernism in its ideological dictatorship, there would probably be nobody to appreciate this.

Conclusion

In this essay, I discuss the present challenge that postmodernism faces on the political front in the confrontation between the EU and Russia over Ukraine. I am not a supporter of Putin; I merely show that his stance demonstrates the shortfall of postmodernism. Postmodernism has been victorious over modernism, but this victory can easily lead to the dogmatic assertion that this is the only valid and acceptable paradigm. In fact, this is already thought to be the only "politically correct" view for the media to promote. When this paradigm is eventually enforced as an ideology, it can easily, as so often happened in the past - think of Marxism - lead to loss of freedom for alternative paradigms and even dictatorship.

I obviously do not know what will eventually happen. As such, this essay is like a time capsule, like a letter in a bottle. It refers to things in the distant future. It refers to the time when the EU project has transformed itself into a powerful force on the world stage - maybe even a great and powerful empire [1]. Only then will the ideological impulse behind postmodernism become visible for all to see. But then there will maybe not be anybody to appreciate this final failure of postmodernism - except those who will face the full force of its might. As such, this essay will be forgotten long before it becomes relevant. And who will then read it?

[1] Click on  The European Union: forever rising
I discuss the transcendental idea in the framework of hermeneutics in the following essays:
Part 1: Can we still believe the Bible: a hermeneutical perspective
Science and Atheism

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. www.wmcloud.blogspot.com)

Is A Third World War Brewing?

In this essay, I discuss the possibility that the current situation in Ukraine and Syria would escalate into a third world war. I take the model of war and peace cycles, the current international geopolitical game and the situation in Syria into consideration. I also discuss the when-question.

The year 2014 is both the 100th commemoration of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 as well as the 75th commemoration of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. And suddenly talk of war is back in the air. Suddenly, after Russia's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine on 21 March, Europeans and others around the world are considering the unthinkable: war can once more encompass Europe and even the world.

Western leaders have reacted in saying that Russia's actions are a breach of the post-Cold War security arrangements on the continent. The acting Ukrainian prime minister, Arseny Yatseniuk, has accused Russia of wanting to start a third world war. He told his interim cabinet in remarks broadcast alive: "The world has not yet forgotten world war two, but Russia already wants to start world war three... Attempts at military conflict in Ukraine will lead to a military conflict in Europe".

Although the world is certainly at this stage not even close to a third world war, it is surely in order to consider the possibility of such a war. We have become so used to peace that the possibility of war seems unreal and even farfetched. There is, however, good reason for informed readers to give it serious consideration. Long before the present escalation of conflict in Ukraine I wrote that we must seriously consider the possibility of another great war, comparable with the First and Second World Wars, breaking out in the next few years [1]. I based that on the work of one of the greatest minds in the history of political thinking, namely Professor Nicholas John Spykman (1893–1943) of Yale University.

In this essay, I consider strategic, geopolitical and historical reasons why another great war is a real possibility. In this regard we should not only focus on Russia; we should consider the bigger picture in the world. This picture includes the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, the standoff with Iran as well as China. We should consider the likelihood of a broad network of strategic alliances being formed between opposing factions without which such a war would not be possible (although regional wars would obviously be possible). Only when all these aspects are integrated into our considerations, are we in a position to evaluate the current threat to world peace.

War and peace cycles

In 1942 Prof. Spykman published a study entitled “America's Strategy in World Politics”, sponsored by the Yale Institute of International Studies. In this, he made the astonishing claim that war and peace follow a cyclical pattern. Although there are many wars in the world, he arranged them (especially those in which the British participated) into a pattern, showing that for the past 150 years (at that stage) all major wars could be classified into three types, with one of these, the truly great wars, somehow adhering to a cyclical pattern. In my own study, I have confirmed that this pattern persisted even after the Second World War and statistical analysis predicts that, if this is true, then the period around 2014 is the most likely date for another great war. This does not mean that such a war will break out this year; rather, it suggests that if there is indeed such cycles of war and peace, then another great war can be expected in the next few years. 

I first discussed these war and peace cycles and the possibility of another great war breaking out in the next few years in my book Die Arabiese Opstande (2011). In early 2012, I posted a more detailed analysis of war and peace cycles on this blog [1]. In that essay I considered the last 100 years in some detail, focusing on the characteristics of both the war and the peace phases of such cycles. In this period I found four war and peace cycles, commencing on average every 25 anew, which adhered to the same characteristics. The great wars during this period were the First World War, the Second World War, the Vietnam War and the climax of the Cold War (which had some unique characteristics due to the fact that the opposing powers both had nuclear weapons). 

In all these wars there were worldwide networks of opposing military alliances which included all the major powers in the world. Britain's participation in such wars was subsequently replaced by that of the Anglo-American establishment, about whom another well-known historian, professor Carroll Quigley, wrote the very informative book The Anglo-American Establishment (1949). This alliance holds to this day and NATO became its military arm. The characteristics of the war and peace phases of these cycles which I discerned in my previous analysis are:

The war phase of the cycle typically commences with a financial crisis, followed by a recession/depression and a period of economic stagnation. Thereafter occurs a great war against one of the most important imperialistic competitors of the Anglo-American establishment. Sometimes the initial crisis is followed by a short period of some economic growth, but eventually, it results in a recession, after which the war starts. During the war, there is a concerted effort (not always successful) to restrict and reduce the power of their most important political and economic competitors and to promote the Anglo-American political-territorial interests. A new balance of power is also established with the purpose of keeping the most important role players in check.

The peace phase starts directly after the war. It is typically characterized by a post-war recession (a “reconversion crisis”), followed by a prolonged period of economic growth and boom. During this period some mild economic downturns may occur, but on the whole, it is a long period of growth. Although it is called a peace phase, some of the other types of war (mentioned earlier) do occur during this period, through which the scene for the next great war is set up. During the peace phase, the objective is to include as many countries as possible in the framework of world trade with the purpose of maximizing the gains of the Anglo-American financial magnates, who pursue a policy of free trade.

In that essay, I came to the conclusion that Iran would be the primary opponent in such a war for the simple reason that it poses a major threat to Anglo-American interests in the Middle East which are closely interwoven with that of Israel. And the fact that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon makes them a soft target. But this does not mean that Iran would be the only country involved in such a war. For it to be a major war, compared with the ones mentioned, other major powers will have to be involved also. In this regard, Russia, with its close ties with Iran, would seem to be an obvious partner as part of the network of military alliances opposing NATO in such a war. Russia's possible involvement, as well as that of other countries such as China, must, however, be considered in geopolitical terms. 

Geopolitics

Another important aspect of the war and peace phases is the play between stability and instability during those phases. The peace phase is characterized by a stable balance of power between the world powers, with the winners of the previous great war dominating the scene. When the war ends without a clear winner among the great powers, such stability rests on the even balance between those powers (for example, after the Vietnam War when the West and the USSR were evenly balanced). Towards the end of this phase, however, some of the other powers become real imperialistic competitors of the Anglo-American establishment. 

During the war phase, which typically commences after a great financial and subsequent economic crisis (these economic crises were in 1907-8, 1929-33, 1957-58, 1980-82, 2008-9), the world suddenly becomes more unstable. The reason for this is that the stable balance of power in which one superpower dominates a mono-polar world (emperial Britain or the US) or two powers are evenly balanced in a bi-polar world (the US and USSR), makes way for a multi-polar world in which various players actively participate in the pursuit of power - when the great powers try to maneuver themselves into positions of power. This happened before all the great wars which I mentioned. It is now happening again with the other powers sensing that the Great Recession has damaged the financial power of the West and with it, its ability to project power. And they are preparing strategies to assert themselves in ways unthinkable a few years ago.

One of the most important factors which determine such actions are geopolitical concerns. This is when countries take geography into consideration in their political ambitions to expand and project their power. Again, in this area, Prof. Spykman is probably the most important thinker of the past century. His theory of "containment" to this day plays a central role in the thinking of all the war strategists of the major powers. I discussed his theory (as well as those of Mahan and Mackinder) in an essay that I wrote earlier this year (posted on 2 February) in which I focused on the present international pursuit of geopolitical power [2]. 

In my discussion of the major players in this game, namely China, the EU, the US and Russia, I mentioned that the eastern expansion of the EU has placed enormous geopolitical pressure on Russia and that the eastern partnership program of the EU, had it been signed with all the earmarked countries (the Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), would have contained Russia beyond the Ural mountains. I wrote that "such a Russia is effectively stripped of all geopolitical possibilities to expand its power". Since Russia is cornered, one should not be surprised by the "strong-armed" tactics of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. No wonder that (shortly after my writing) Russia initiated its program to take control over the Crimea, where its Black Sea fleet is stationed in Sevastopol. This followed directly after the successful uprising against the Russian-favored Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych.

I will not here repeat the things discussed in that essay (which is now even more relevant than before). In the same manner that Russia is strangled by the expansion of the EU, China is encircled by US allies or partners (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia). In the same manner that Russia has annexed the Crimea, China has also annexed certain reefs in the South China Sea in recent years. In November 2013 China even proclaimed a new air defence zone which includes the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu by the Chinese) which belong to Japan. In January 2014 it further announced that it would this year take over control of the Philippine-occupied Pagasa island (the second biggest island in the Spratlys). 

The main difference between Russia and China is that Russia is a declining power, struggling to keep its options for future power projection open, whereas China is a growing power whose strategic interests are coming more and more in direct conflict with that of the US. China's rise would result in it becoming a major sea power (see the mentioned essay) and its projection of power into the East and South China Seas will become more asserted. Both Russia and China are at a paradigmatic moment regarding their geopolitical interests and would use every possible opportunity to take control of surrounding areas which they consider of strategic interest. If they work in concert and initiate sudden moves which do not endanger US core interests, thinking they can get away with it (testing the waters), the worldwide situation can easily escalate towards more confrontation. 

The recent 400 billion dollar agreement between these countries, according to which Russia would supply China with gas for 30 years, must be seen in this context. This can be the beginning of closer ties between these countries against the US and its allies. Russia is clearly preparing for war insofar as its military budget is concerned, which has just surpassed that of the US in GDP terms. For a large scale confrontation with the West, to try and secure its geopolitical interests, Russia would need China; China can gain a lot from such an alliance in its growing confrontation with Japan and other Western allies and partners in that region. 

 The theatre of war

We should not see the events in Ukraine in isolation. Russia is not only under pressure in its own backyard; it is also under enormous pressure in the only other important part of the world where it still has some influence after the fall of the USSR, namely the Middle East. There its partners Syria and Iran are under great pressure. Syria is involved in a civil war and Iran is strangled by sanctions. In a certain sense, the conflict in Syria stands at the centre of the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. If the Syrian regime falls, Russia will not only lose its Mediterranean naval base at Tarsus, it will be effectively excluded from the Middle East (except for its relation with Iran). This is why Russia so fiercely defends its ally, both in the UN Security Council and on the ground where it provides the Syrian regime with weapons and even training. 

Already in December 2011 in an essay on this blog, I predicted that Russia would stand by Syria and that it would not follow the path of the other Arab Spring countries where revolutions had been successful (that is before the counter-revolutions in some of those countries). I also mentioned that Iran would probably become involved and that the Syrian conflict can eventually escalate into a wider Middle Eastern war. Although other neighbouring countries have not thus far become directly involved, Iran did and today the Iranians play a very important role in steering the Syrian war effort with its allies Hezbollah and other Shiites from Iraq. As in the case of Russia, Iran also has a lot to lose would the Syrian regime fall. Not only would the important Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Shiite axis, which allows Iran to project its power all over the Middle East, be broken and its ally Hezbollah be left isolated, it would also make it much easier for the Israelis to attack Iran on its home ground. 

It seems to me quite possible that the conflict in Syria (which includes Iran) could eventually become the theatre where the next great war begins - if it comes to that. Although such a conflict would also play off in other areas of the world (near Russia or China), I think the epicentre would be in the Middle East. It seems very unlikely that such a conflict would ever be fought on Russian soil (because of its nuclear weapons); it is, however, very possible that it would, at least in part, be fought in Syria and Iran. Not only are Russia and Iran already supporting the Syrian regime, the West is slowly but steadily increasing its support for the rebels. Over the last few months funding, weapons and training of certain moderate rebel groups have strengthened their relative power in rebel circles.

In a major foreign policy speech on 28 May at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Barack Obama recently announced a five billion dollar “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund” to train local forces in the Middle East and Africa. Obama reversed his past opposition to large-scale American arming and training of Syrian rebels and said that strengthened moderate rebel groups could serve as a counterweight to radical Islamist groups. The US, Saudi-Arabia and others are already training the rebels for some time in Jordan (at least since 2013) and the CIA played a major role in establishing Brig. Gen. Abdul-Illah al-Bashir, an important leader of the Free Syrian Army, in the Golan town of Quneitra. They have also started providing the rebels with heavy weaponry.

The Syrian conflict and Russia's involvement in Ukraine would probably with time become closely intertwined. The US would try to force Russia's hand in Ukraine with threats of providing the rebels with even better weapons. We can see Obama's speech in these terms. Furthermore, Russia and Iran are not only close friends which are involved in the same conflict in Syria, both are now also under Western sanctions. This would bring them even closer to each other and it is quite possible that Russia (and China) would in future break ranks with the West on Iranian sanctions if the nuclear negotiations do not succeed. Russia and Iran also recently announced a 20 billion dollar oil-for-food deal and they are in talks about another 10 billion dollar energy deal. One can easily see how Iran can become part of a Russia-China-Iran axis of powers opposed to NATO.

When can such a war be expected?

The important question is: If the war and peace cycles and geopolitical concerns suggest that we can expect a major war over the next few years, when will it commence? This is an extremely difficult question to answer, but I can mention some of the factors that would play an important role in this regard. I ranked them from the most to the least importance.

1. The war phase. We can consider the details of the war phase of the cycle more closely to see what precedes the outbreak of such wars. These phases typically begin with a financial crisis, followed by a deep depression or recession and a prolonged period of stagnation thereafter. The present cycle clearly commenced with the financial crisis of 2007 which was followed by the Great Recession of 2008-9 and the period of stagnation (especially in the EU) ever since.

In two of the previous cycles, this involved another recession just before the war starts. Since this did not occur in all the cycles we cannot, in general, take it as signalling the outbreak of war. The average period from the financial crisis to the outbreak of war is 7 years. In the period which preceded the Second World War, it, however, took 10 years (the longest period registered) from the financial crisis in 1929 to the outbreak of the war in 1939. This means, statistically speaking, that the chance for such a war is the greatest over the next three years (2014-17), but it is always possible that it can take even longer before it starts.

2. Iranian nuclear negotiations. Although the present negotiations between Iran and the six world powers are not often described in those terms, they are probably the last effort to avoid direct confrontation between Iran and a US-led alliance (that includes Israel), which can easily escalate into another great war. Without a deal, Iran poses an existential threat to Israel and the Anglo-American establishment will not tolerate that. A breakdown in negotiations can, therefore, lead to war with Iran, which in my opinion can easily lead to another great war in the cycle of such wars.

As long as the talks proceed it seems unlikely that the situation in Syria would escalate into direct Iran-US-Israel confrontation. One can furthermore expect all the parties to the talks to do everything in their power to come to an agreement. The problem is that such an agreement must not only satisfy Israel, it must also satisfy the Iranian security establishment. Although the current Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, is a moderate, he faces growing criticism at home. A coup against him would change everything and can dramatically escalate the conflict between Israel and Iran. The Iranians have all reason to think that giving up their nuclear deterrent would leave them exposed to Western attack [3]. This would make an agreement very difficult to reach.

3. The Obama administration. I have previously discussed the strategic interests of the US, Israel, France, Iran and Russia regarding the situation in Syria [3]. Since the US is the leader of the Western nations, they will not go to war without her. The Obama administration, however, will do everything to avoid war. They are nonetheless under enormous pressure in the US because of the perception that the enemies of the US are taking advantage of Obama's reluctance and even aversion to war. It seems, however, that Obama will not easily take the US into another war. If they are not overtaken by events, it will probably fall to the next US president to decide on this. But remember President Woodrow Wilson, who promised peace and then took the US into World War I.

4. Oil and gas supplies. One can expect that a great war with its epicentre in the Middle East will have a dramatic impact on the oil price and can destabilize the world economy. This will count in Russia's favour, which is a major oil and gas exporter. Also, Russia is in a strong position because of the EU's dependence on it for its fuel. The EU imports about 39% of its gas and about 33% of its oil from Russia. Since the Ukraine crisis, the EU has been actively exploring other options. They have access to other fuel resources but some of these are also under pressure, for example in Libya.

There is, however, a very important change in world fuel production in progress which would impact on the situation. Gas-fracking has changed the fuel market beyond recognition. The US is already self-sufficient and will probably start exporting in the near future. The EU leaders have even talked to President Obama about getting fuel from the US. He mentioned that this is subject to the successful conclusion of the free trade agreement between the US and the EU. One expects that the Western nations would try to solve this problem before deciding to go to war.

5. The US-EU free trade agreement. For some readers, it would seem strange that I mention this point. I, however, think that this is an important issue which will decide whether and when such a war breaks out. The reason is that such a great war would generate a common enemy for the EU on a scale not seen before. This will propel the EU into further integration in the same manner that the economic crisis did. Such a war, which includes Russia as the aggressor on its eastern border, will bring the EU nations together and allow the Euro countries to proceed with further integration. Those right-wing groups who have done so well in the last EU election, and who view President Putin as the hero, will come under enormous pressure to be "patriotic" and loyal to the EU. The reason why the US-EU trade agreement is important is that the US would not like to see the EU become so powerful if it is not safely embedded with them in one economic zone. The US would probably want to see at least substantial agreement on trade issues before going into a large-scale war.

In my opinion, the Vietnam War in important aspects provides our best precedent for the current situation. Both then and now we see a proxy war which escalated (or can escalate) into a war in which all the major world powers participated (or participates). In that case, the conflict between the Viet Cong and the government of the anti-communist South began in 1955. The US sent the first support troops in 1961 and became directly involved only in 1965. The current Syrian conflict started early in 2011 and the US has only recently announced that they would become more actively (but not directly) involved. One can expect that particular incidents would serve as the reason for deeper participation, but that is obviously impossible to predict. I do not think that we can take the timescales of the US involvement in the Vietnam War as the basis for projections (one example cannot count as statistics), but I do think that the present situation can follow at least that pattern in the run-up to such a war.

Conclusion

There has recently been talk about a "third world war". Leaders often engage in such talk for reasons of their own. In this case, however, it seems that there are reasons to think that the present situation in Syria and Ukraine can easily escalate into a major war which involves the major powers around the globe (if not The Third World War). The most important reason why I think that such a war could very well be on hand is that the present circumstances fit perfectly with my model of war and peace cycles. The events in Syria and Ukraine are not isolated instances; they are closely connected in the geopolitical game currently underway in the world. An analysis of the geopolitical situation shows that more such conflicts can be expected and that it can easily escalate even more. Of central importance in this regard is that Russia, China and Iran are moving closer to each other. Their short-term goals are closely linked and they all experience some form of Western containment which strangles them.

When would such a war break out if it comes to that? This is an extremely difficult question to answer. I have mentioned various factors which are important in this regard. On the whole, it seems that the West is not yet ready for war. Although the situation can change fast, it seems that such a war will not easily start under the Obama administration (but remember President Wilson!). The most important factor which will determine what will happen and when is the nuclear negotiations with Iran. We can take it as an important barometer regarding a possible future war which could include not only Israel and Iran but also the other major powers.

[1] Click on Predicting a war against Iran? - an inquiry into war and peace cycles
[2] Click on The pursuit of geopolitical power in an emerging multi-polar world
[3] Click on War-clouds darken over the Middle East

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

See also: A New Iranian Empire is rising.

The pursuit of geopolitical power in an emerging multi-polar world

In this essay, I discuss the role of geopolitics in the emerging world order. For the first time in decades, we see a multi-polar world emerging and various world powers (especially China, Russia and the EU) are challenging the old order. But what are their strategies? And how do they try to realize them? Although technology plays an important role, the old game of geopolitics is back in town. I discuss the most important geopolitical strategies and how these world powers are incorporating them in their thinking. I also show how this helps us to understand the current situation in Ukraine.

There are longs periods during which the international political landscape in the world is quite stable. And then there are periods in which it is extremely unstable (typically ending in great wars). At this stage in the history of the world, we are moving from a stable to an unstable situation. Although the world is not yet in the precarious situation of being unstable, it is changing fast and the signs are clear that a new phase in the political history of the world has begun. There is a sense that the playing field has opened up and that opportunities are presenting themselves. The other important players (other than the US) sense that the Great Recession has damaged the financial power of the West and with it its ability to project power. And they are preparing strategies to assert themselves in ways unthinkable a few years ago.

Stability in the international political landscape always has its origin in a stable balance of power between world powers. This can include a situation where one superpower rules (a mono-polar world) or where two great powers are more or less evenly balanced in various parts of the world (bi-polar-world). Generally, these are periods of peace when commerce flourishes. During the last few centuries this happened during the period of the British empire in the eighteenth century, during the long period when the West and the USSR were evenly balanced in power (before the Cold War came to a climax during the last part of the 1980's) and again during the period of US dominance over the last few decades.

But there are also periods during which the world was very unstable. This typically involves a multi-polar world in which various players actively participate in the pursuit of power - when the great powers try to manoeuvre themselves into positions of power. This happened when Imperial Germany challenged British power just before the First World War and again when Nazi Germany challenged the Anglo-American power just before the Second World War. It also happened when Communism spread all over the east and the West tried to block that in the period before and during the Vietnam War. And it is happening again - in the period since the Great Recession.

The great powers follow various strategies in their pursuit of power. These could include an effort to try and out-sprint each other in military capability, both regarding new technologies and brute power. This can typically be measured in military spending. At the end of the Cold War the West out-sprinted the USSR for the simple reason that it became overstretched and did not have the economic and innovative ability to keep competing (that is why China combined its communism with a form of open economy). But there is another important factor in the power game. Although it is not often mentioned, it played a very important role in the thinking of the great military powers of the past and the present. This is geopolitical concerns. Various geopolitical strategies for world domination have been developed which involve control of certain strategic geographic areas of the world. The use of such strategies depends on a country's own geographic position.

Classical geopolitical strategies

There are essentially three major geopolitical strategies. The first was developed by Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), a US naval officer. He studied the British Empire and concluded that its navy was the basis for its success. He developed the concept of "sea power" according to which countries with greater naval power will have the greater worldwide impact. He presented his ideas in his famous book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1600-1793 (1890). His ideas had a great impact on the thinking of many strategists since that time and even today it is important in US Naval Doctrine. This strategy seems to be especially well suited for trading countries like Britain or the US, which need large navies to protect their financial interests. Although such countries were historically island countries which were in some sense protected from enemies by the sea which surrounds it (even the US can be viewed as a large island away from the large world mass of Euro-Asia), this advantage has diminished due to technological developments over the last century. Nowadays trade moves along sea, air, land and advanced communication routes.

The second strategy was developed by Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1947), a British geographer. He viewed history as a constant battle between sea power and land power. Whereas sea powers have the ability to control the sea, land powers have the ability to control the major crossing points on land (railroads, oil pipelines etc.). He studied the world's land mass to establish which part of it is of central importance for any land power to effectively control the world. In his view, this involves controlling the "World Island", which includes Europe, Asia and Africa (i.e. two-thirds of the available land). The other smaller "islands" like North and South America or Australia are less important. Furthermore, to control this large land mass (especially the "Heartland" which includes Europe and Asia) one have to control eastern Europe. Traditionally the European powers and Russia came into conflict over this area. If the area between the Black and Caspian Seas is included in "eastern Europe", this means effective control of all the routes going from Russia to Europe and the Middle East.

The third important strategy was developed by Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943), a US scholar of international politics. He brought Mahan and Mackinder's strategies together. In his view, the most important geographical area to be controlled is not so much eastern Europe, but the "rimland". This includes the area surrounding the "Heartland" of Euro-Asia and consists of various sections, namely the European Coastal areas, the Arabian-Middle Eastern desert land and the Asiatic monsoon, by which he means the civilizations surrounding the Chinese cultural sphere. Anyone who controls the "rimland", be it land powers in Euro-Asia or Sea powers, controls the world. His view greatly influenced the US containment strategy, of both the USSR and China.

Current power games

Countries have no control over the geographical area where they are situated. The US is an "Island" country, and China, Russia and the EU (the only ones to be discussed in this essay) are land powers in Euro-Asia. Since large deserts divide Russia and China, and the possibilities for power expansion in these areas are restricted, it is easy to see why Russia has traditionally projected its power to the west and south (i.e. towards Europe and the Middle East) and China has projected its power towards the seas to the south and east. For China, any effective projection of power would, first of all, involve control of those areas. During the Cold War, when the power of the US and the USSR were quite evenly balanced, the US controlled the seas as well as a large part of the rimland (but lost control in Vietnam), whereas the USSR controlled eastern Europe as well as parts of the rimland. At the end of the Cold War, the USSR lost control over those areas, but the US held and strengthened theirs.

There are mainly two reasons why the international political situation in the world is changing. The one is the rise of China. Over the last few decades, the Chinese rulers have come to the conclusion that the only way to effectively grow their power is through rapid technological and economic development and that involves trade. Furthermore, they have concluded that the best strategic geopolitical model suited for their circumstances, is the one associated with trade, namely of sea power as envisioned by Mahan [1]. The Chinese have built a powerful navy and are challenging US containment. They have tense relations with nearly all their neighbours to the east and south, including Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan (things have calmed somewhat due to Taiwan's current policy of appeasing China). In November 2013 China even proclaimed a new air defence zone in the East China Sea of which about half overlaps with Japan's own air defence zone. The Senkaku islands (called Diaoyu by the Chinese) are in this area. In reaction, the Japanese have increased their military budget for the first time in more than a decade.

The other reason for the changing world situation is the geographical rise of the EU, which now includes 28 countries. Although the rise of the EU has not really drawn much attention because the EU is not viewed as a strong military power and some have taken the economic crisis in the EU to signify its decline, in geographical terms, the EU has dramatically expanded its reach. It is exactly this eastern expansion of its influence which has brought it into conflict with Russia over Ukraine. Before its independence, Ukraine had been part of the Soviet-Union. What we have seen, is that the EU has effectively expanded its control over a very large part of eastern Europe which, according to Mackinder, is needed for any ambitions to have eventual control of the world. Would the ex-Soviet states of Ukraine and Armenia have signed association agreements with the EU as part of the eastern partnership program at the end of 2013 (together with Moldavia, Georgia and Azerbaijan), it would have been the first step to contain Russia beyond the Ural mountains. Such a Russia is effectively stripped of all geopolitical possibilities to expand its power - no wonder that the Russian president, Putin, has used strong-arm tactics to prevent them from signing.

The Arab Spring could play an important role in shaping this emerging world. If all the Arab countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea would eventually, maybe after some decades, turn into democracies (some expected that to happen overnight!), their natural home would be the EU. From a geopolitical point of view, this would give the EU control of a large part of the rimland. If it ever happens that other Arab countries in the Middle East, like Syria and Iraq, would also move in this direction, the EU could in principle become the most powerful country in the world (This is because of such possibilities that Spykman was very much against the unification of Europe). Since its rise is so peaceful, nobody expects it to become such a superpower. But that can change if some EU countries proceed to form a political union (become politically integrated) and have strong military capabilities at their disposal.

The outcome of the war in Syria could also have a major impact on the emerging world order. The reason why Russia is supporting the Syrian regime is simply that it is one of their last allies in the Middle East. If Syria becomes democratic, Russia would be excluded from the Middle East (except for its alliance with Iran). Together with the EU's eastern partnership (if that ever comes to full fruition), this would reduce Russia to a large but impotent country. So, Putin's cunning power games is not a sign of Russia's rise, but rather of its struggle to keep some of its prospects for power open.

On the other hand, the US's reluctance to bomb the Syrian regime in 2013 after it used chemical weapons against the rebels, had been taken by many Middle Eastern countries as a sign that the US does not have the same motivation as in the past to become involved in conflicts in the region. Although it is clearly a good strategy to first get rid of Syria's chemical weapons before any direct Western participation in the conflict, it none the less seemed to countries like Saudi-Arabia and Israel (and probably Iran and Russia) that the war-weary US is becoming an unreliable partner. Since the US will become self-sufficient in fuel-production in the near future, it clearly does not have the same motivation than in the past to secure Western fuel supplies in the Middle East. The US has also stated that they have the intention to focus more on securing their strategic interests in the east, with the rise of China in mind. It is possible that the US will eventually need all their resources to contain a rising China in the east. This will open a strategic space in the Middle East which will most probably be filled by the EU (although Iran, together with Russia, will do all in their power to resist this).

The US has spent a lot of effort in promoting peace in the Middle East. They got the Israeli-Palestinian peace process going again, are trying to bring the Syrian regime and the rebels to the negotiation table and are also trying to force Iran to let go of its nuclear ambitions. Although such an effort to promote peace seems noble, there are some problems associated with this approach, namely 1) it seems that the Obama administration is trying to promote peace at all costs (or avoid war at all costs?), and 2) lasting peace has historically only been achieved when the world moved from an unstable political landscape towards a more stable one (typically after great wars), never when the world is moving from a stable to an unstable situation, from a unipolar world to a multipolar one. The result is that the major players see this as an opportunity to enhance their positions in the intermediate period before everything becomes extremely unstable. They try to manoeuvre themselves to outplay the others.

Conclusion

The world is changing fast and a new multi-polar world is emerging in which China, Russia, the US and the EU are the major players. In (classical) geopolitical terms, the US has been using the ideas of Mahan and Spykman for about a century to enhance its own power. They have controlled the seaways and the rimland. But this situation will not stay static. Their control of both the sea as well as the rimland (especially in the east) is challenged by China, who is also seriously considering implementing Mahan's strategy. Although China has not yet made any major move in this regard, it seems quite possible that they will eventually do so - especially when they think they are in a position to succeed (maybe with fast, land-grabbing military exercises). It is possible that the containment of China will eventually force the US to apply all its resources in this regard.

The alliance between the US and the EU within the framework of NATO, and the free-trade zone that is being negotiated between them, implies that the US could (and probably would eventually have to) leave the European borderlands to the EU as primary (but maybe not sole) defender thereof. This will only happen once the EU has developed into a major military player as well. In the meantime, it has used its soft power to enhance its own interests to such an extent that it has effectively secured eastern Europe and could very well eventually include the countries around both the Black and Mediterranean Seas in its sphere of influence. This will give them control over large parts of the rimlands bordering Europe and the Middle East. If Russia is effectively excluded from this zone, the EU could become the new and final (?) unipolar superpower in the world. Although this seems improbable at this point in history, this is exactly what geopolitical analysis predicts.

[1]  Part1-3: Inside China's military buildup (Reuters investigates).


Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

See also: The rise of the final world empire: the different views
 The euro countries move towards a fiscal union: an eschatological perspective