Obama outplayed: France moves in

Over the last two years, the world has entered a new phase in its history which is much more unstable than before. Various major players are competing to fill the gap left by Obama's idealistic and isolationist approach. One of these is the Islamic State (IS). The attack on Friday 13 November 2015 in Paris has activated the French to lead the effort against IS as well as stabilizing the balance-of-power in the Syrian conflict after Russia became militarily involved.

With the IS attack in Paris on Friday 13 November 2015, the peoples of the Western world were rudely awakened to the reality that they have entered a totally new world. This was not merely a spectacular attack by a distant enemy; it signalled a new phase in the international political landscape. The old world - which was (for the most part) stable, peaceful, prosperous and largely predictable (except for so-called "failed states" at the edge of civilization), has changed in less than two years into one that is exactly the opposite, namely unstable, full of conflict, insecure and very unpredictable. And this is not yet the full extent of what can be expected. If history is our guide, we can expect that this new multi-polar world would go through a period of intense upheaval and conflict before the waters calm down again.

Less than two years ago, on 2 February 2014, I wrote that we are entering a new phase in world history in which the stable political landscape that we knew for decades has begun to disintegrate. That was before Russia invaded the Crimea in Ukraine and before ISIL became a major player. I wrote: "Although the world is not yet in the precarious situation of being unstable, it is changing fast and the signs are clear that a new phase in the political history of the world has begun. There is a sense that the playing field has opened up and that opportunities are presenting themselves. The other important players (other than the US) sense that the Great Recession has damaged the financial power of the West and with it its ability to project power. And they are preparing strategies to assert themselves in ways unthinkable a few years ago." [1]

One of the main reasons for this dramatic change is the position of the Obama administration. US President Obama's foreign policy can be summarized in two motto's: 1) Work towards enforcing a rule-based international order with negotiation as the basic tool 2) Use military force with extreme caution and then only hesitatingly when there is overwhelming pressure to do so (that is, excluding the US drone program). This is exactly the opposite of the Bush-doctrine. With this unilateral idealist and isolationist approach, the US has effectively created a wide-open geopolitical space (especially in the Middle East) in which many powerful role-players are competing for power and influence.

It is in this political space that Russia, Iran, China, IS and now also France and its EU partners are stepping into. The enemies of the West know that this window of opportunity might close when Obama leaves the White House. And they are moving fast. As the only Western power willing to confront this situation, France is becoming an important champion of Western interests in this new world - taking up a role which has for decades been reserved for the US as the leader of the Western world.

The major players in the new geopolitical power-game

All the major powers have made significant geopolitical moves over the last two years. The first substantial move in this regard was a Russian one: On 27 February 2014, Russia occupied the Crimea which belonged to Ukraine. In this context, the Russians introduced a new method of war, namely the "hybrid war" which involves many aspects which are designed to mislead the enemy. Then, at the beginning of March 2014, Russia instigated insurrections with eventual Russian military support in the Donbas areas of eastern Ukraine. On 30 September 2015 Russia also became militarily involved in the conflict in Syria. In all these cases the Russians have acted to secure their own geopolitical interests, especially their ability to project power beyond their immediate homeland (from their naval bases in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol and the Syrian port city of Tartus).

Other important players followed the Russian example. Since 2014 China began to aggressively extend its control in the South China Sea (which it claims as its own), turning seven reefs into artificial islands. In less than two years China has reclaimed more than eight square kilometres (ninety football fields), building three airstrips. As with the Russian actions, the speed and scale of this undertaking have surprised all the other players in the region. Since the beginning of 2015, Iran has also dramatically increased its tactical and military support for its allies: the Assad regime, Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shiites and the Houthis in Yemen (see [2] for a detailed discussion). There are more than a thousand Iranian soldiers fighting alongside Assad's forces and Iranian warplanes accompany Russian bombers over the Syrian skies. In Yemen, Iran's covert involvement in support of the Houthis prompted Saudi-Arabia to lead a nine-nation coalition in a military campaign to stop the spread of the Iranian influence in their neighbourhood.

Iranian warplanes accompanying Russian bombers over Syria

The projections of power by these major players stretch from Ukraine, through the Middle East to the South China Sea. In all these areas they (Russia-Iran-China, which might have entered into a secret military alliance) are trying to expand their geopolitical position at the expense of other countries which belong to the Western sphere of influence. These conflicting interests are especially intense in the context of the Syrian Civil War. The reason for this is simple: if the Syrian rebellion is successful, Russia would lose its last footprint in the Middle East and Iran's influence in the Middle East would decrease dramatically. This is why I said shortly after the outbreak of the Syrian rebellion in 2011 in the context of the Arab Spring that the conflict would escalate to involve other countries due to the fact that Russia would stand with the Assad regime [3]. Now many countries are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict. On the one hand, there are Russia, Iran, Hezbollah; to counter their influence the US (CIA), Saudi-Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and others have started training moderate (and not-so-moderate) rebel groups who fight against the Assad regime and provide them with weaponry.

Another group that has been able to dramatically increase their projection of power on the world stage is the Islamic State (IS). Before 2014, ISIL (the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant), as it was known since April 2013 when the Islamic State of Iraq merged with the Al-Nuzra Front (the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda), was just one of many military groups active in the Syrian conflict. But then, on 29 June 2014, they declared a world-wide caliphate and began a very aggressive effort towards territorial expansion which led to control over a large area stretching from Aleppo in Syria to the heartlands of central Iraq. Since then, satellite IS groups have been formed in Libya, Yemen, Egypt (in the Sinai Peninsula), Saudi-Arabia, Algeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Northern Caucasus and other countries. Over the last few weeks, they have claimed responsibility for attacks in Turkey, Yemen, Lebanon, the downing of a Russian passenger plane over the Sinai and the Paris attacks. 

The rise of IS is directly related to the power-game involving the other major players. Since the legal grounds for involvement on the side of the rebels in the Syrian conflict is restricted according to the principle of non-interference in a sovereign country without UN agreement, the existence of IS in that geographical area provides an entry point into that conflict without direct involvement against the Assad regime. As such, countries like the US who strongly support a rule-based international order (for example, against Russia's engagement in Ukraine), could establish a physical military presence in the area without directly engaging the Syrian regime - which would be important in case the Syrian Civil War evolves into a major war. The fight against IS provides various countries with a cover to promote their interests in the Syrian Civil War: the US, Turkey, Saudi-Arabia and Qatar assist the rebel groups whereas Russia bombs Assad's enemies (during the first stage of their bombing campaign, 90% of their targets were other Syrian rebel groups than IS, some of which are supported by the US). 

The very existence of IS is in the interest of certain countries. In general, the geographical area that IS controls in Iraq and Syria effectively forms a buffer zone against Iran's military expansion in the region. This suits Sunni governments like Saudi-Arabia and Turkey well. Then, the fight against IS may also provide dictatorial regimes like that of Egyptian President Sisi and leaders with such tendencies like Turkish president Erdogan with excuses to eliminate or subdue their political opponents (Turkey's initial leniency towards IS was the reason why its conflict with the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) flared up again - PKK cadres attacked security forces whom they believed allowed IS to plant bombs in Kurdish areas). Previously, in the fight against Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani military also secretly supported affiliated Islamist militants, which led to a low-point in its relations with the US. 

The main reason why countries like Russia, Iran, China and IS have been able to dramatically increase their geopolitical footprint over the last two years, is that they understood that the unilateral focus of the Obama administration on an idealist approach to world events, with an accompanying aversion in a realist approach which focuses on geopolitical concerns, has created an enormous geopolitical space which other strong players can occupy without serious consequences. Even Obama recognized this when he made a humiliating policy reversal in June 2014, ordering US troops back to Iraq.

Of special concern for the West (apart from the IS threat) is Russia's involvement in Syria which has dramatically disrupted the balance of power in the Syrian conflict. And the hands of the US are tied due to the Obama approach. Even in the face of the about 250 000 war dead, most of which are civilians of which about 90% have been killed by Assad's indiscriminate bombing! Then there is the Iran-factor. The lifting of sanctions against Iran early in 2016 (in accordance with the negotiated agreement with the P5+1 to dismantle their nuclear capacity) would release up to $100 billion to that country, which is of great concern for its opponents in the Middle East, especially Israel and Saudi-Arabia.

France enters the game

Until the 13 November 2015 attack in Paris, the French involvement in the Syrian conflict was quite moderate. The reason for this is that France, with all the Western countries, accepted the leadership role of the US in such matters. This has now changed. France is the only other Western country with the ability to step into the gap that the US has left on the Near Eastern scene. They are the only major player that can come to the rescue of Western interests in the Middle East. (Britain, which has previously been a major military player, has recently become a very untrustworthy partner in this regard). France is a staunch supporter of the moderate Syrian rebels and is one of a few countries (including the US and Britain) who recognize the Turkey-based Syrian National Council (SNC) as a legitimate representative of the Syrian people in the context of the Syrian Civil War.

There can be no doubt that the 13 November 2015 attack in Paris has galvanized the French in a manner very similar to that in which the 11 September 2001 attack activated the US into action against Al-Qaeda. Comparisons have been made between the speeches given by George W. Bush and Francois Hollande after the attacks as well as the wording of the resolutions tabled shortly afterwards at the UN security council. The response of the US was primarily a military one - they activated article 5 for the first time in NATO's history. The French responded differently: they activated the collective defence article 42.7 in the EU's Lisbon treaty. Although France has a lot of experience in such matters - they were recently militarily involved in stabilizing both the Central African Republic as well as Mali, where they fought with the government against Islamist militants (the attack on the luxury Radisson Blu Hotel in Mali's capital Bamako which came shortly after the Paris attack, might have been an effort to discredit the French involvement there and make it harder to reach its goal in the Syrian context) - they previously struggled to get the rest of the EU on board with them. 

The French approach is much more sophisticated than that of the US. Whereas the US has struggled to develop a coherent approach - they either have too much focus on military involvement or too little; they have either a too unilateral approach (only in the framework of NATO) or tried to merely train and support local partners (without any direct combat involvement) - the French have been able to combine all of these, namely local partners, restricted "boots on the ground" and a good balance between diplomatic and military engagement. The refugee crisis recently forced other EU countries like Germany too also contemplate deeper involvement - even with a military dimension - in unstable regions in its neighbourhood. We might in future see that the EU develops a more substantial coordinated military approach to secure its own backyard. Such an approach would combine the soft power for which the EU is known, with the restricted use of hard power.

The UN resolution that the French tabled after the Paris attack, which was accepted on 20 November 2015, may provide the legal framework not merely for more intensive involvement against IS, but also more generally in Syria. The reason is that the permission of the Assad regime is not required for such intervention, which calls "upon member states that have the capacity to do so to take all necessary measures ... on the territory under the control of ISIL ... in Syria and Iraq." This may allow the anti-Assad forces led by France and the US to establish boots on the ground in Syria (at first only special forces). At the same time, France would try to restrict the Russian attacks on the moderate opposition by involving them in some manner in the fight against IS (the US and its EU partners are also actively trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, which would isolate Iran in its support for Syrian President Assad).

The resolution also targets the Al-Nusra Front which has broken ranks with IS. This may allow countries that back the Syrian rebels to more openly do so, also with air support (ostensibly in their fight against both IS and Al-Nusra) - which would necessarily also mean that they are better equipped to fight the Assad-regime. On the other hand, the resolution may allow Russia and Iran to target those Islamist groups supported by Saudi-Arabia and Qatar that fights alongside Al-Nusra. The outcome may be an escalation in the Syrian conflict, which in turn may lead to a full-blown proxy war between the two opposing alliances - especially when the IS threat is reduced in the area.

In my view, the Syrian conflict may eventually escalate into another major war (see [4]). At this stage, there are renewed efforts to kick-start a negotiated transition process but the main stumbling block, namely the future role of Syrian President Assad, has not been removed. Although there is currently a lot of talk about a grand coalition against IS, the fault-line between the opponents and supporters of the Assad regime, between the Sunni-countries led by Saudi-Arabia and Shiite Iran, between the Western-backed alliance and Russia-Iran-Assad alliance, may become more accentuated once IS has been degraded to a more manageable threat.  

For now, France has found a way to stabilize the balance-of-power in the Syrian conflict but when the sanctions against Iran are lifted in 2016, the conflict may intensify further. Although IS may pose a threat for decades to come, its ability to strike again in the EU has already been severely restricted through a substantial upgrading of the Schengen zone in the EU as well as improved information-intelligence sharing between EU countries (some even speak of the eventual formation of an EU intelligence agency).

Conclusion

Over the last two years, our world has become a very unstable place where major players compete in the geopolitical space created by the Obama doctrine. As such IS is just one such player and it would be wrong to think that this common threat would bring about a substantial alliance between all the other role players. Although IS is definitely a major threat to the stability of the world, the larger geopolitical game poses an even greater threat - namely that of a major war, even another world war. Again, it would be wrong to see the actions of France after the attack in Paris merely in the context of IS; rather, the acceptance of the UN resolution that France tabled, actually allows the various players in the Syrian conflict to more openly support the opposing groups. Whereas the military involvement of Russia in the Syrian conflict has upset the balance-of-power in that conflict, the French actions may allow the Western nations to effectively counter the Russian actions.

In my view, the dramatic escalation of instability on the world scene over the last two years is only the beginning. As I previously suggested from my geopolitical analysis of world events [1], we are entering another phase in world history - a war phase, that will bring enormous upheaval. In the same manner that the Vietnam War gradually escalated into a major war, I foresee that the same could happen in the Syrian conflict. Russia, Iran and China might try to maximize their geopolitical gains before president Obama depart; he would leave it to his successor in the White House to clean up his mess. 

[1] Click on The pursuit of geopolitical power in an emerging multi-polar world
[2] Click on A New Iranian Empire is rising
[3] On 5 December 2011. Oorlogswolke begin oor die Midde Ooste saampak.
[4] Click on Is A Third World War Brewing?

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

A New Iranian Empire is rising

In this essay, I consider the dramatic rise in Iran's influence and power in the Middle East over the last few years and how that impacts on future developments in that region. I discuss the possible scenarios regarding such a resurgent Iran in the context of the Syrian conflict, IS and the conflict in Yemen (where a Saudi-led coalition is fighting the Iranian-supported Houtis).

The last few years have seen a spectacular reshaping of the Middle-Eastern political landscape. Although most commentators focus on the rise of IS (Islamic State), whose cruelty has grabbed the headlines, in my view the really important event is the dramatic rise of Iranian influence in the Middle East. Suddenly Iran has become a much more assertive player in that region, which leaves the other major powers like Israel, Saudi-Arabia, Egypt and Turkey very uneasy.

In this essay, I consider the reasons why Iran has been able to expand their influence so dramatically as well as the implications that this has for the future of the Middle East. The issue over Iran's nuclear program is now overshadowed by the enormous power that they have gained in the period while the talks lasted. Even if Iran would never build a nuclear bomb, their power has grown to such an extent that all future geopolitical analysis would have to include them as one of the major players - even as the most important one (Israel excluded) - in the Middle East.

Iran's growing influence and power in the Middle East

Over the last few years, the Iranians have extended their hold on power all over the Middle-East - in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. In this regard, they have empowered all the Shiites or related groups across the Middle East (like the Syrian Alawites to which the Assad dynasty belongs). At first, they merely supported the Assad regime in Syria. When their partners, the Lebanese Hezbollah, became involved in the Syrian civil war their influence grew to such an extent that Iranian generals now lead the Syrian-Hezbollah-Shiites in some areas in their conflicts with the Syrian rebels.

In Iraq, the Iranian influence has grown due to the threat posed by IS. Many of the Shiite militias that sprang up in Iraq are now coordinated as a single group, called the Popular Mobilization Committee (Hashid Shaabi), by the Iranians. They are led by Jamal Jaafar Mohammed, right-hand man of the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani, who is head of the Quds Force, a part of Iran's Revolutionary Guard. In the battle for Tikrit Soleimani became openly involved as the leader of those groups. In Yemen, Iran's partners, the Shiite Houthis, have become the de facto rulers after taking over most of the important parts of the country, including the capital Sanaa. Their southward push toward the city of Aden, last bastion of Yemen's elected President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi (who fled to Saudi-Arabia), resulted in the intervention on 26 March of the Arab states under the leadership of Saudi-Arabia in that conflict. The primary reason for this Saudi intervention is to counter the enormous growth in Iranian power in the region.

What we see is that the Iranians with their alliance partners, Hezbollah, the Assad regime, the Iraqi Shiites and the Houthis are now in control of a large part of the Middle East stretching from Iran to the borders of Israel and Saudi-Arabia. Even though they do not officially control all these countries, their partners have strong military forces that are not subjected to the national armies (and can operate as they please). They are indeed in a very powerful position and it is very possible that they would in future become an even more powerful force. As one can expect, this leaves the other Middle Eastern countries very nervous and uneasy about these developments.

The role of the Obama administration

How did this happen? This Iranian projection of power is primarily due to the manner in which the Obama administration handled the situation in the Middle East. First, they did not provide any significant support to the moderate Syrian rebels which allowed IS to become the dominant force in eastern Syria and north-western Iraq. It seems that they did not want to upset the Iranians who are involved in that conflict and with whom they were in talks regarding their nuclear enrichment program. When the US-led coalition became involved in the fight against IS, they even had to accept Iran's involvement in Iraq against IS [1]. In fact, according to newspaper reports president Obama sent a secret letter to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in which he suggested the possibility of US-Iranian cooperation in fighting IS once a deal regarding its nuclear program has been reached. It seems that the whole US strategy against IS has to some extent become reliant on Iran.

Irrespective of the eventual outcome of an agreement with Iran, the space which the Obama administration allowed Iran to occupy in the Middle East cannot be easily reversed. Iran has dramatically extended its influence in the Middle East at the cost of the other countries. It might be that this was in fact from the beginning an important aspect of Iran's strategy during the nuclear talks, namely to play for time while they extend their power in the Middle East! This expansion of Iranian power has brought them to Israel's borders where Iran is involved in the fighting between the Assad-regime and the rebels at Israel's Golan border where they (Israel) some time ago shot down a helicopter leading to the death of an Iranian general and various Hezbollah military commanders. In this Iranian offensive, the divisions in the ranks of the US's Middle Eastern partners, namely between those who represent the counter-revolution after the Arab Spring (Saudi-Arabia, the UAE and Egypt) and those who support Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood who gained momentum through the Arab Spring (Turkey and Qatar), have played into Iran's hands.

Iran can easily consolidate its power. Even if they do not build a nuclear bomb, they now have a very powerful base from which to consolidate and expand their power. Even though the division in the ranks of the Sunni states weakened the Arab response, this dramatic rise in Iran's power has forced them to find common ground. The GCC (the Gulf Cooperation Council of Arab countries) has recently decided on a unified military command and at the last Arab League meeting at the end of March in Egypt they decided to form a joint military force of willing countries.  

Saudi-Arabia was also able (on short notice) to put together a coalition of nine countries to fight the Houthis and to enforce a no-fly zone in Yemen (i.e. Saudi-Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Sudan). Turkey also expressed their support for this action. The new Saudi king, King Salman, who is more pragmatic than his predecessor, may eventually succeed in overcoming the divisions regarding the Muslim Brotherhood which would unite the Sunni block (which may include Turkey) in any military confrontation with the Shiite alliance led by Iran.

The larger geopolitical game

On the surface, it is difficult to understand the Obama administration's decisions which are the most important reason why Iran ended up in this powerful new position. Why would the US allow Iran to use the period of the nuclear negotiations to expand their power so dramatically? It seems to me that a possible answer may lie in the larger geopolitical picture which also involves Russia's role in the Middle East.

When we compare the Obama administration's handling of the Ukrainian crisis with their handling of the Syrian crisis, they are much more decisive in the first situation. Whereas the US takes a more confrontational position against Russia - who has also expanded their own sphere of influence in annexing the Crimea and supporting the rebels in eastern Ukraine - they were much more reluctant to do anything in the Syrian situation so as not to affront Iran. The US played a major role in the sanctions that have so far been installed against Russia whereas they allowed the Iranians to spread their sphere of direct involvement up to Israel's borders.

Why this difference in approach? It is possible that the US is trying to win the Iranians over from a possible Russia-Iran-China axis. In this regard, the US may think that a future world in which these countries are aligned would seriously limit their own sphere of interest - comparable with the Cold War period when the balance-of-power in the world was quite evenly balanced between the USSR and the West. We may compare the Obama administrations' move in this regard with Henry Kissinger's China "card" - when he went in secret to China in 1971 and convinced them to enter into more friendly relations with the US. The result was that the USSR was left isolated in its conflict with the West. This was part of the containment strategy that eventually led to the fall of the USSR. As such, flipping Iran would also leave Russia quite isolated - especially regarding its geopolitical aspirations in the Middle East. In this context, the successful conclusions of the negotiations with Iran may be viewed not merely in terms of Obama's legacy or resolving the nuclear issue for some time, but as an effort to change the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East.

There is, however, another possible outcome to this approach that may not be so positive. We can compare beleaguered Iran with Russia at the end of the Cold War. In contrast with the aftermath of the Second World War when the main enemies of the West, namely Germany and Japan, were effectively defeated and then incorporated in the Western sphere of influence, Russia was treated as an equal after the collapse of the USSR. The West did not assert their victory (they could not effectively do that due to Russia's nuclear weapons) but treated Russia very much as an equal. At first, it seemed that Russia would accept Western values and become a democracy - but that is not what happened in the end. Russia is rising again as an opponent of the West and commentators now talk of a new "Cold War".

What would Iran do? In my opinion, this approach will not result in Iran becoming part of the Western sphere of influence. In spite of any agreement with the P5+1 countries (the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, i.e. the US, Britain, France, Russia, China as well as Germany), Iran will assert their own (new-found) position and try to extend their influence even further. The only way in which Iran would become included in the Western world is when they are defeated in war (as was the case with Germany and Japan). If this does not happen, they would take exactly the same route as Russia after the Cold War. They would take care of their own interests - which would be to consolidate their position.

Since Iran is not as powerful as China, the China-card option will not work with them - they know that any distance between them and Russia would leave them vulnerable to future Western demands and actions. One can, therefore, expect that Iran will not allow the West to drive a wedge between them and Russia. They would rather try to consolidate their new role as one of the most important players in the Middle East.

The war scenario

One possible scenario is that the Middle Eastern situation regarding Iran is defused by an agreement between Iran and the P5+1. This would effectively mean that the other Middle Eastern countries (grudgingly) accept the new hegemony of Iran over large parts of the Middle East. This may mean that some agreement between the moderate rebels, whose power has been significantly reduced by the al-Nusra and Syrian regime forces, and the Assad regime has to be reached. If Iran can achieve this, they would be able to further consolidate their power. They could, for example, enhance the military capabilities of their partners - which would put further pressure on Saudi-Arabia and Israel. They have already deployed heavy weapons, including missile systems, in the conflict in Iraq (Fajr-5 artillery rockets and Fateh-110 missiles are mentioned). If this process continues unchecked, Iran's offensive capabilities in the region may eventually overshadow that of the Sunni block (such a change in the balance of power in the Middle East may also upset this peaceful scenario).

Another scenario is that the situation in the Middle East is not defused even when an agreement is reached. Although the Obama administration may confirm the outcome through a UN resolution, this may not dissolve the tension that Iran's increased projection of power in the Middle East has caused - it could even increase such tension if the Sunni block (and Israel) feels that their core interests have been compromised. An increase in Iran's power in the Middle East may force a future US administration to become more aggressively involved to counter the Iranian influence - especially insofar as Israel, Syria and even Yemen are concerned. That may mean that an agreement with Iran may eventually be regarded in similar terms than the Munich Agreement of 1938 which led the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to proclaim "peace for our time", but which ended in World War II. In that case, Obama would be remembered in the same way as Chamberlain (in fact, Obama referred to Chamberlain's words during his last inauguration speech).

The scenario that is especially dreadful, is the one that ends in another great war. The greatest potential for escalation in this regard is probably in the context of the Syrian civil war (although the Yemen situation is also escalating fast). The US has belatedly decided to start official training of moderate rebels - to assist in the fight with IS (but not against the Assad regime). Although the Obama administration would probably try to keep it at that, the possibility is not excluded that they would at some stage have to support such forces against the Assad regime (both the Turks and the Saudis strongly support military engagement against the Assad regime). That could lead to a dramatic escalation in the conflict.

The reason why the conflict in Syria has the potential for such escalation is that Iran is so deeply involved. Once the US-led coalition decides to include the Assad-regime with IS as a target for attack (maybe under the next US administration), this will bring the US and its Arab partners in conflict with Iran and even Russia. (Although the conflict in Yemen may escalate in that direction, this would not involve Russia as long as it is contained to that area). Iran would try to disrupt such an effort against Assad, using their partners to destabilize other parts of the Middle East. At this point, the conflict can easily escalate into a war between the Iranian led Shiite-axis and the Sunni block supported by the US (and even Israel). One of the reasons why the US tries to stabilize Iraq (over and above improving their ability to fight IS) is to prevent that country from being used as a mere proxy of Iran. But even if the Iraqi army becomes a powerful and neutral force in the country (as we find in Lebanon), Iran would still be able to call upon the powerful Popular Mobilization Committee - at the very least to provide soldiers for battle.

Such a Middle Eastern War could escalate to include other important countries in the same manner that happened during the Vietnam War. In this regard, one can expect that an Iran-Russia-China axis could come into being. This will bring NATO into the picture. Even without going into detail, one can imagine that this could change our world for good [2]. One outcome would be that the EU would become much more integrated - even developing a clear military dimension far beyond the current coordination. Another may involve a weakened but resurgent Iran - similar to Germany after the First World War. One thing is sure: Iran's rise has changed the Middle East for decades to come.

A new Persian empire?

At this point, we should consider the current growth of Iranian influence in the Middle East in historical context. We should remember who the Iranians are. Although post-revolutionary Iran is a newcomer on the world scene, the Iranian people have a long and distinguished history. During a visit to this great country, one does not only see the ruins of the palaces of the great Iranian rulers of the past; one also finds a proud nation who remembers those days. Any visitor who leaves without a beautifully illustrated copy of Ferdowsi's Shahnameh - The Epic of the Kings - have truly missed out.

The Iranians did not only give the world a few great empires throughout history; they also constituted a formidable enemy to the Western nations and their empires. The great Persian empires embodied the most important opponents of both the Greeks and the Romans. East and West first met each other when Darius the Great, ruler of the First Persian Empire (539-312 BC), invaded Greece but was halted at Marathon (490 BC). Later Xerxes again invaded Greece (480-479 BC) in the first great confrontation between these powers which eventually led to the formation of the Athenian Empire (448 BC). Later the Parthian empire (250 BC - 224 AD), which included Persia, stopped the eastern expansion of the Roman Empire. This was followed by the Sasanian Empire (also called the second Persian empire; 224-651 AD).

Sasanian Empire in 620 AD [3]

Now, after slumbering for a long time, the Persians are back. In this case, they are using the ties between Shiites to project their power. If one believes that history follows certain patterns, you might see this within the context of the current geopolitical rise of the European Union in the footsteps of the great Greek and Roman empires of old. Is the rise of Iran in some manner linked with that of their ancient foes? Are we once again going to see the same great opposing powers of old rising up to oppose each other? Would a more powerful and politically integrated EU rise from such conflict in a similar manner that the old Athenian empire did? Would the geopolitical map of recent history, in which the United States and Russia became important players, again over the next few centuries give way to a world in which the EU and Iran fill the shoes of the great Roman and Persian empires of old?

At this point, one might add an eschatological perspective to this picture. There is a major current in Biblical eschatology that takes the beast of Revelation 13 as referring to the final (Antichristian) empire of this age. This beast is depicted as combining the various beasts mentioned previously in a prophecy in the Book of Daniel (ch. 7), which are taken as referring to the various great empires that would arise throughout history to rule over Israel. These beasts include a lion (the Babylonian empire), bear (Persian empire), leopard with four heads (Alexander the Great's empire and its divisions) and an enormous beast with ten horns on its head (taken as the Roman empire). The fact that all of these are included in one depiction in Revelation 13 is taken to mean that the final world empire would include the geographical area of all those past empires (see [4]).

As such this final empire will include a re-established Roman empire in Europe that rules over all the areas of the other empires, including that of the Persians. This reminds of the empire of Alexander the Great, who ruled over both west and east. For this to happen, the Western forces would have to eventually include Iran in their family of nations. The current overtures of the Obama administration toward Iran may be the first step towards bringing Iran closer to the West. In the light of the discussion above, I can, however, not see this happening if Iran is not dramatically destabilized or even conquered by Western forces and then integrated into the West (like Germany and Japan after WWII).

This prophecy seems to imply that Iran will never be able to grow a nuclear arsenal which will make such a victory very difficult (but maybe not impossible). The question is when one can expect this prophecy to go into fulfilment if this interpretation is correct? In my view, the world may very well be moving in that direction, but it will take many years for it to come to pass. We also do not know if such a war or wars with Iran lie in the near or distant future. What we do see, is that a resurgent Iran is back on the world stage just as in times of old.

Conclusion

At this point, I have to leave the reader to form his/her own opinion. The analysis given above suggests that we are entering a new phase in world history which might involve more conflict than the previous decades combined. I gave various possible scenarios - without asserting that they are the only ones. The dramatic rise in the power of Iran over the last few years during the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program has already changed the world. There is no turning back. What is strange, is that this is the direct result of the policies of the Obama administration. In trying to make the world a safer place in which the Iranian nuclear issue is resolved, they may have actually made it much more dangerous! In allowing Iran to extend its power up to Saudi-Arabia and Israel's borders, they have sown the seeds for future conflict.

Although the relation with Iran may yet be managed in a peaceful manner, it seems to me that the enormous growth in Iranian influence and power in the Middle East has already upset the balance of power in that region. Once the US-led alliance decides to also focus on the Assad regime (and not only on IS) - to cripple the Iranian axis at its weakest spot - this would bring the Shiite axis in direct confrontation with the Sunni block (although such a confrontation may also evolve out of the conflict in Yemen). At this point, things can easily escalate into chaos - and another great war may ensue. Normally peace follows war; in this case, war may follow the peace effort. The white horse of peace might be followed by the red horse of war!

[1] I have previously said (see [2]) that the Syrian situation may force the US to become involved in the Middle East if some unforeseen incidents require that. This happened after IS suddenly conquered large geographical areas in Syria and Iran and the US brought a wide coalition of Sunni states together in the war against IS.
[2] See Is A Third World War Brewing?
[3] Map was taken from Wikipedia
[4] The rise of the final world empire: the different views

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

Is A Third World War Brewing?

In this essay, I discuss the possibility that the current situation in Ukraine and Syria would escalate into a third world war. I take the model of war and peace cycles, the current international geopolitical game and the situation in Syria into consideration. I also discuss the when-question.

The year 2014 is both the 100th commemoration of the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 as well as the 75th commemoration of the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. And suddenly talk of war is back in the air. Suddenly, after Russia's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine on 21 March, Europeans and others around the world are considering the unthinkable: war can once more encompass Europe and even the world.

Western leaders have reacted in saying that Russia's actions are a breach of the post-Cold War security arrangements on the continent. The acting Ukrainian prime minister, Arseny Yatseniuk, has accused Russia of wanting to start a third world war. He told his interim cabinet in remarks broadcast alive: "The world has not yet forgotten world war two, but Russia already wants to start world war three... Attempts at military conflict in Ukraine will lead to a military conflict in Europe".

Although the world is certainly at this stage not even close to a third world war, it is surely in order to consider the possibility of such a war. We have become so used to peace that the possibility of war seems unreal and even farfetched. There is, however, good reason for informed readers to give it serious consideration. Long before the present escalation of conflict in Ukraine I wrote that we must seriously consider the possibility of another great war, comparable with the First and Second World Wars, breaking out in the next few years [1]. I based that on the work of one of the greatest minds in the history of political thinking, namely Professor Nicholas John Spykman (1893–1943) of Yale University.

In this essay, I consider strategic, geopolitical and historical reasons why another great war is a real possibility. In this regard we should not only focus on Russia; we should consider the bigger picture in the world. This picture includes the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, the standoff with Iran as well as China. We should consider the likelihood of a broad network of strategic alliances being formed between opposing factions without which such a war would not be possible (although regional wars would obviously be possible). Only when all these aspects are integrated into our considerations, are we in a position to evaluate the current threat to world peace.

War and peace cycles

In 1942 Prof. Spykman published a study entitled “America's Strategy in World Politics”, sponsored by the Yale Institute of International Studies. In this, he made the astonishing claim that war and peace follow a cyclical pattern. Although there are many wars in the world, he arranged them (especially those in which the British participated) into a pattern, showing that for the past 150 years (at that stage) all major wars could be classified into three types, with one of these, the truly great wars, somehow adhering to a cyclical pattern. In my own study, I have confirmed that this pattern persisted even after the Second World War and statistical analysis predicts that, if this is true, then the period around 2014 is the most likely date for another great war. This does not mean that such a war will break out this year; rather, it suggests that if there is indeed such cycles of war and peace, then another great war can be expected in the next few years. 

I first discussed these war and peace cycles and the possibility of another great war breaking out in the next few years in my book Die Arabiese Opstande (2011). In early 2012, I posted a more detailed analysis of war and peace cycles on this blog [1]. In that essay I considered the last 100 years in some detail, focusing on the characteristics of both the war and the peace phases of such cycles. In this period I found four war and peace cycles, commencing on average every 25 anew, which adhered to the same characteristics. The great wars during this period were the First World War, the Second World War, the Vietnam War and the climax of the Cold War (which had some unique characteristics due to the fact that the opposing powers both had nuclear weapons). 

In all these wars there were worldwide networks of opposing military alliances which included all the major powers in the world. Britain's participation in such wars was subsequently replaced by that of the Anglo-American establishment, about whom another well-known historian, professor Carroll Quigley, wrote the very informative book The Anglo-American Establishment (1949). This alliance holds to this day and NATO became its military arm. The characteristics of the war and peace phases of these cycles which I discerned in my previous analysis are:

The war phase of the cycle typically commences with a financial crisis, followed by a recession/depression and a period of economic stagnation. Thereafter occurs a great war against one of the most important imperialistic competitors of the Anglo-American establishment. Sometimes the initial crisis is followed by a short period of some economic growth, but eventually, it results in a recession, after which the war starts. During the war, there is a concerted effort (not always successful) to restrict and reduce the power of their most important political and economic competitors and to promote the Anglo-American political-territorial interests. A new balance of power is also established with the purpose of keeping the most important role players in check.

The peace phase starts directly after the war. It is typically characterized by a post-war recession (a “reconversion crisis”), followed by a prolonged period of economic growth and boom. During this period some mild economic downturns may occur, but on the whole, it is a long period of growth. Although it is called a peace phase, some of the other types of war (mentioned earlier) do occur during this period, through which the scene for the next great war is set up. During the peace phase, the objective is to include as many countries as possible in the framework of world trade with the purpose of maximizing the gains of the Anglo-American financial magnates, who pursue a policy of free trade.

In that essay, I came to the conclusion that Iran would be the primary opponent in such a war for the simple reason that it poses a major threat to Anglo-American interests in the Middle East which are closely interwoven with that of Israel. And the fact that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon makes them a soft target. But this does not mean that Iran would be the only country involved in such a war. For it to be a major war, compared with the ones mentioned, other major powers will have to be involved also. In this regard, Russia, with its close ties with Iran, would seem to be an obvious partner as part of the network of military alliances opposing NATO in such a war. Russia's possible involvement, as well as that of other countries such as China, must, however, be considered in geopolitical terms. 

Geopolitics

Another important aspect of the war and peace phases is the play between stability and instability during those phases. The peace phase is characterized by a stable balance of power between the world powers, with the winners of the previous great war dominating the scene. When the war ends without a clear winner among the great powers, such stability rests on the even balance between those powers (for example, after the Vietnam War when the West and the USSR were evenly balanced). Towards the end of this phase, however, some of the other powers become real imperialistic competitors of the Anglo-American establishment. 

During the war phase, which typically commences after a great financial and subsequent economic crisis (these economic crises were in 1907-8, 1929-33, 1957-58, 1980-82, 2008-9), the world suddenly becomes more unstable. The reason for this is that the stable balance of power in which one superpower dominates a mono-polar world (emperial Britain or the US) or two powers are evenly balanced in a bi-polar world (the US and USSR), makes way for a multi-polar world in which various players actively participate in the pursuit of power - when the great powers try to maneuver themselves into positions of power. This happened before all the great wars which I mentioned. It is now happening again with the other powers sensing that the Great Recession has damaged the financial power of the West and with it, its ability to project power. And they are preparing strategies to assert themselves in ways unthinkable a few years ago.

One of the most important factors which determine such actions are geopolitical concerns. This is when countries take geography into consideration in their political ambitions to expand and project their power. Again, in this area, Prof. Spykman is probably the most important thinker of the past century. His theory of "containment" to this day plays a central role in the thinking of all the war strategists of the major powers. I discussed his theory (as well as those of Mahan and Mackinder) in an essay that I wrote earlier this year (posted on 2 February) in which I focused on the present international pursuit of geopolitical power [2]. 

In my discussion of the major players in this game, namely China, the EU, the US and Russia, I mentioned that the eastern expansion of the EU has placed enormous geopolitical pressure on Russia and that the eastern partnership program of the EU, had it been signed with all the earmarked countries (the Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan), would have contained Russia beyond the Ural mountains. I wrote that "such a Russia is effectively stripped of all geopolitical possibilities to expand its power". Since Russia is cornered, one should not be surprised by the "strong-armed" tactics of the Russian president, Vladimir Putin. No wonder that (shortly after my writing) Russia initiated its program to take control over the Crimea, where its Black Sea fleet is stationed in Sevastopol. This followed directly after the successful uprising against the Russian-favored Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych.

I will not here repeat the things discussed in that essay (which is now even more relevant than before). In the same manner that Russia is strangled by the expansion of the EU, China is encircled by US allies or partners (South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia). In the same manner that Russia has annexed the Crimea, China has also annexed certain reefs in the South China Sea in recent years. In November 2013 China even proclaimed a new air defence zone which includes the Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu by the Chinese) which belong to Japan. In January 2014 it further announced that it would this year take over control of the Philippine-occupied Pagasa island (the second biggest island in the Spratlys). 

The main difference between Russia and China is that Russia is a declining power, struggling to keep its options for future power projection open, whereas China is a growing power whose strategic interests are coming more and more in direct conflict with that of the US. China's rise would result in it becoming a major sea power (see the mentioned essay) and its projection of power into the East and South China Seas will become more asserted. Both Russia and China are at a paradigmatic moment regarding their geopolitical interests and would use every possible opportunity to take control of surrounding areas which they consider of strategic interest. If they work in concert and initiate sudden moves which do not endanger US core interests, thinking they can get away with it (testing the waters), the worldwide situation can easily escalate towards more confrontation. 

The recent 400 billion dollar agreement between these countries, according to which Russia would supply China with gas for 30 years, must be seen in this context. This can be the beginning of closer ties between these countries against the US and its allies. Russia is clearly preparing for war insofar as its military budget is concerned, which has just surpassed that of the US in GDP terms. For a large scale confrontation with the West, to try and secure its geopolitical interests, Russia would need China; China can gain a lot from such an alliance in its growing confrontation with Japan and other Western allies and partners in that region. 

 The theatre of war

We should not see the events in Ukraine in isolation. Russia is not only under pressure in its own backyard; it is also under enormous pressure in the only other important part of the world where it still has some influence after the fall of the USSR, namely the Middle East. There its partners Syria and Iran are under great pressure. Syria is involved in a civil war and Iran is strangled by sanctions. In a certain sense, the conflict in Syria stands at the centre of the geopolitical confrontation between Russia and the West. If the Syrian regime falls, Russia will not only lose its Mediterranean naval base at Tarsus, it will be effectively excluded from the Middle East (except for its relation with Iran). This is why Russia so fiercely defends its ally, both in the UN Security Council and on the ground where it provides the Syrian regime with weapons and even training. 

Already in December 2011 in an essay on this blog, I predicted that Russia would stand by Syria and that it would not follow the path of the other Arab Spring countries where revolutions had been successful (that is before the counter-revolutions in some of those countries). I also mentioned that Iran would probably become involved and that the Syrian conflict can eventually escalate into a wider Middle Eastern war. Although other neighbouring countries have not thus far become directly involved, Iran did and today the Iranians play a very important role in steering the Syrian war effort with its allies Hezbollah and other Shiites from Iraq. As in the case of Russia, Iran also has a lot to lose would the Syrian regime fall. Not only would the important Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Shiite axis, which allows Iran to project its power all over the Middle East, be broken and its ally Hezbollah be left isolated, it would also make it much easier for the Israelis to attack Iran on its home ground. 

It seems to me quite possible that the conflict in Syria (which includes Iran) could eventually become the theatre where the next great war begins - if it comes to that. Although such a conflict would also play off in other areas of the world (near Russia or China), I think the epicentre would be in the Middle East. It seems very unlikely that such a conflict would ever be fought on Russian soil (because of its nuclear weapons); it is, however, very possible that it would, at least in part, be fought in Syria and Iran. Not only are Russia and Iran already supporting the Syrian regime, the West is slowly but steadily increasing its support for the rebels. Over the last few months funding, weapons and training of certain moderate rebel groups have strengthened their relative power in rebel circles.

In a major foreign policy speech on 28 May at the United States Military Academy at West Point, President Barack Obama recently announced a five billion dollar “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund” to train local forces in the Middle East and Africa. Obama reversed his past opposition to large-scale American arming and training of Syrian rebels and said that strengthened moderate rebel groups could serve as a counterweight to radical Islamist groups. The US, Saudi-Arabia and others are already training the rebels for some time in Jordan (at least since 2013) and the CIA played a major role in establishing Brig. Gen. Abdul-Illah al-Bashir, an important leader of the Free Syrian Army, in the Golan town of Quneitra. They have also started providing the rebels with heavy weaponry.

The Syrian conflict and Russia's involvement in Ukraine would probably with time become closely intertwined. The US would try to force Russia's hand in Ukraine with threats of providing the rebels with even better weapons. We can see Obama's speech in these terms. Furthermore, Russia and Iran are not only close friends which are involved in the same conflict in Syria, both are now also under Western sanctions. This would bring them even closer to each other and it is quite possible that Russia (and China) would in future break ranks with the West on Iranian sanctions if the nuclear negotiations do not succeed. Russia and Iran also recently announced a 20 billion dollar oil-for-food deal and they are in talks about another 10 billion dollar energy deal. One can easily see how Iran can become part of a Russia-China-Iran axis of powers opposed to NATO.

When can such a war be expected?

The important question is: If the war and peace cycles and geopolitical concerns suggest that we can expect a major war over the next few years, when will it commence? This is an extremely difficult question to answer, but I can mention some of the factors that would play an important role in this regard. I ranked them from the most to the least importance.

1. The war phase. We can consider the details of the war phase of the cycle more closely to see what precedes the outbreak of such wars. These phases typically begin with a financial crisis, followed by a deep depression or recession and a prolonged period of stagnation thereafter. The present cycle clearly commenced with the financial crisis of 2007 which was followed by the Great Recession of 2008-9 and the period of stagnation (especially in the EU) ever since.

In two of the previous cycles, this involved another recession just before the war starts. Since this did not occur in all the cycles we cannot, in general, take it as signalling the outbreak of war. The average period from the financial crisis to the outbreak of war is 7 years. In the period which preceded the Second World War, it, however, took 10 years (the longest period registered) from the financial crisis in 1929 to the outbreak of the war in 1939. This means, statistically speaking, that the chance for such a war is the greatest over the next three years (2014-17), but it is always possible that it can take even longer before it starts.

2. Iranian nuclear negotiations. Although the present negotiations between Iran and the six world powers are not often described in those terms, they are probably the last effort to avoid direct confrontation between Iran and a US-led alliance (that includes Israel), which can easily escalate into another great war. Without a deal, Iran poses an existential threat to Israel and the Anglo-American establishment will not tolerate that. A breakdown in negotiations can, therefore, lead to war with Iran, which in my opinion can easily lead to another great war in the cycle of such wars.

As long as the talks proceed it seems unlikely that the situation in Syria would escalate into direct Iran-US-Israel confrontation. One can furthermore expect all the parties to the talks to do everything in their power to come to an agreement. The problem is that such an agreement must not only satisfy Israel, it must also satisfy the Iranian security establishment. Although the current Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, is a moderate, he faces growing criticism at home. A coup against him would change everything and can dramatically escalate the conflict between Israel and Iran. The Iranians have all reason to think that giving up their nuclear deterrent would leave them exposed to Western attack [3]. This would make an agreement very difficult to reach.

3. The Obama administration. I have previously discussed the strategic interests of the US, Israel, France, Iran and Russia regarding the situation in Syria [3]. Since the US is the leader of the Western nations, they will not go to war without her. The Obama administration, however, will do everything to avoid war. They are nonetheless under enormous pressure in the US because of the perception that the enemies of the US are taking advantage of Obama's reluctance and even aversion to war. It seems, however, that Obama will not easily take the US into another war. If they are not overtaken by events, it will probably fall to the next US president to decide on this. But remember President Woodrow Wilson, who promised peace and then took the US into World War I.

4. Oil and gas supplies. One can expect that a great war with its epicentre in the Middle East will have a dramatic impact on the oil price and can destabilize the world economy. This will count in Russia's favour, which is a major oil and gas exporter. Also, Russia is in a strong position because of the EU's dependence on it for its fuel. The EU imports about 39% of its gas and about 33% of its oil from Russia. Since the Ukraine crisis, the EU has been actively exploring other options. They have access to other fuel resources but some of these are also under pressure, for example in Libya.

There is, however, a very important change in world fuel production in progress which would impact on the situation. Gas-fracking has changed the fuel market beyond recognition. The US is already self-sufficient and will probably start exporting in the near future. The EU leaders have even talked to President Obama about getting fuel from the US. He mentioned that this is subject to the successful conclusion of the free trade agreement between the US and the EU. One expects that the Western nations would try to solve this problem before deciding to go to war.

5. The US-EU free trade agreement. For some readers, it would seem strange that I mention this point. I, however, think that this is an important issue which will decide whether and when such a war breaks out. The reason is that such a great war would generate a common enemy for the EU on a scale not seen before. This will propel the EU into further integration in the same manner that the economic crisis did. Such a war, which includes Russia as the aggressor on its eastern border, will bring the EU nations together and allow the Euro countries to proceed with further integration. Those right-wing groups who have done so well in the last EU election, and who view President Putin as the hero, will come under enormous pressure to be "patriotic" and loyal to the EU. The reason why the US-EU trade agreement is important is that the US would not like to see the EU become so powerful if it is not safely embedded with them in one economic zone. The US would probably want to see at least substantial agreement on trade issues before going into a large-scale war.

In my opinion, the Vietnam War in important aspects provides our best precedent for the current situation. Both then and now we see a proxy war which escalated (or can escalate) into a war in which all the major world powers participated (or participates). In that case, the conflict between the Viet Cong and the government of the anti-communist South began in 1955. The US sent the first support troops in 1961 and became directly involved only in 1965. The current Syrian conflict started early in 2011 and the US has only recently announced that they would become more actively (but not directly) involved. One can expect that particular incidents would serve as the reason for deeper participation, but that is obviously impossible to predict. I do not think that we can take the timescales of the US involvement in the Vietnam War as the basis for projections (one example cannot count as statistics), but I do think that the present situation can follow at least that pattern in the run-up to such a war.

Conclusion

There has recently been talk about a "third world war". Leaders often engage in such talk for reasons of their own. In this case, however, it seems that there are reasons to think that the present situation in Syria and Ukraine can easily escalate into a major war which involves the major powers around the globe (if not The Third World War). The most important reason why I think that such a war could very well be on hand is that the present circumstances fit perfectly with my model of war and peace cycles. The events in Syria and Ukraine are not isolated instances; they are closely connected in the geopolitical game currently underway in the world. An analysis of the geopolitical situation shows that more such conflicts can be expected and that it can easily escalate even more. Of central importance in this regard is that Russia, China and Iran are moving closer to each other. Their short-term goals are closely linked and they all experience some form of Western containment which strangles them.

When would such a war break out if it comes to that? This is an extremely difficult question to answer. I have mentioned various factors which are important in this regard. On the whole, it seems that the West is not yet ready for war. Although the situation can change fast, it seems that such a war will not easily start under the Obama administration (but remember President Wilson!). The most important factor which will determine what will happen and when is the nuclear negotiations with Iran. We can take it as an important barometer regarding a possible future war which could include not only Israel and Iran but also the other major powers.

[1] Click on Predicting a war against Iran? - an inquiry into war and peace cycles
[2] Click on The pursuit of geopolitical power in an emerging multi-polar world
[3] Click on War-clouds darken over the Middle East

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

See also: A New Iranian Empire is rising.

War-clouds darken over the Middle East

The Syrian conflict has escalated over the last month. Everything seems to suggest that it will escalate even further when the West starts providing the rebels with more advanced weapons. But will it evolve further into a regional war? To answer this question I discuss the strategic interests of the major players, including the US, Israel, France, Iran and Russia.

The Syrian conflict, which started as part of the Arab Spring uprisings in mid-March 2011, has recently intensified dramatically. One could say that the conflict has entered a new phase. Suddenly the surrounding countries have become more actively and openly involved in the Syrian struggle. The war is sucking in, not only the other regional players but also the major world powers. It seems very likely that this conflict will further escalate and become a regional war in which many of the surrounding countries participate.

Over the last few months, many thousands of Hezbollah fighters from nearby Lebanon became openly involved in the battle of al-Qusayr near the Lebanese border in May 2013 during which the government forces won the day. The Iraqi government are also giving tactic support to the regime, allowing Iran to use its airspace and many Iraqi Shiites have joined the war. Iran is providing the regime with strategic advice, weapons, special forces assistance as well as training of military units and has brought the whole Hezbollah-Syria-Iran axis under its control. Iran's ability to project power over the wider Middle-East has therefore also increased. Russia has steadfastly stood with the Syrian regime, providing it with billions of dollars of heavy weaponry. According to various news sources, Russia even started delivery of the sophisticated S300 surface-to-air missile systems for which it will also provide personnel to man them (Russia has previously provided the Syrians with other missile systems).

The rebel forces, on the other hand, are now divided between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the jihadi groups like the Al-Nusra Front who is affiliated to Al-Qaeda (there are in fact many different fighting groups). The jihadi groups have gained influence because they were the only ones with a good supply of weaponry (from wealthy backers in Saudi-Arabia). Recently the EU has dropped its ban on providing the rebels with weapons and EU countries like Britain and France, who are already supplying non-lethal materials, are now free to provide weapons too. The US has recently decided that they would also supply the FSA with weapons. Some weaponry has already been delivered to the FSA. The US have also deployed Patriot anti-aircraft missile systems, F-16 fighter jets and about a thousand marines to the Jordanian side of the border where they are involved, with the Saudis, with the training of rebel forces (six Patriot batteries manned by 1000 American, German and Dutch servicemen have previously been deployed on the Turkish-Syrian border).

How will the Syrian war unfold in the future? In this essay, I discuss this question through an evaluation of the strategic interests of all the major players. Countries typically do what is in their strategic interests. I focus on the US, Israel, France, Iran and Russia. Although countries like Britain [1], Turkey, Qatar, Saudi-Arabia and others are also involved, their interests are for the most part aligned with the US.  

The US and the Syrian conflict

The US has for a long time kept their distance from the Syrian conflict due to the fact that the American public is war-weary after the decade-old war in Afghanistan (not to mention the wars against Iraq). President Obama has been portrayed as a "man of peace" that would do everything in his power to promote peace – and any direct involvement in the conflict could be viewed by his supporters as a betrayal of that ideal. Although Obama has expressed open support for the ideals of the Arab Spring, namely of human freedom and democracy, and has even called the promotion of such ideals part of the strategic interest of the US, these are not in itself a strong enough reason to become involved in the Syrian conflict. There are, however, other strong incentives. Among these are

1. Moral considerations. The Syrian conflict has already resulted in about 100 000 dead, 1.6 million refugees and 4.25 million displaced people within the country itself. The Syrian regime is by far the party who is primarily responsible for the pain, misery and destruction. This provides a very strong moral incentive to try and stop the Syrian regime from continuing doing this. The recently appointed National Security Adviser to President Obama, Susan Rice, is a strong advocate of intervention, mentioning the Rwanda genocide in this regard.

2. Israel. The US administration has a strategic agreement to secure Israel's security which has been endangered by recent developments in the Syrian conflict. The victory of the government forces in the area bordering Lebanon has given Israel's archenemy Hezbollah a stronghold in the area directly opposite the Golan. In the case of an Israeli attack on Iran (to destroy their nuclear facilities), Hezbollah would definitely launch a large-scale attack on Israel. As for Iran, they would pose a substantial threat to Israel if they are to develop a nuclear device. To enable Israel to strike Iran's nuclear facilities (with US support), a no-fly zone along the Jordanian-Syrian border would probably be necessary.

3. Reducing the influence of jihadi groups. The US views itself as still at war with Al-Qaeda. The US is therefore very concerned by the growing influence of jihadic and Al-Qaeda-linked groups among the rebels. These also pose a threat to Israel's security, especially if they gain a permanent stronghold in Syria. The best way to stop their growth is to help the FSA develop the necessary structures on the ground and to supply them with effective weaponry. To eliminate the jihadists, however, more direct involvement in the conflict will be necessary as was the case in Mali (with the French involvement there).

President Obama will not be willing to become more directly involved in the conflict if all other options to solve the crisis have not been explored. At this stage the following efforts have been made: three resolutions have failed in the UN Security Council (because of Russian-China opposition), the jointed UN-Arab peace initiatives of Kofi Annan (the six-point plan) and Lakhidar Brahimi have gone nowhere, the Geneva-1 conference ended without a breakthrough and plans for a Geneva-2 conference have stalled. None of the parties have sufficient motivation to come to an agreement. The regime thinks it is gaining on the rebels and the rebels are not willing to let Assad stay in power after all the bloodshed. At some point, Obama might be able to say that he has tried everything and that the only option left is some form of military intervention.

Israel's strategic interests

Israel has until now stayed out of the conflict – although it has twice in the past few months bombed Syrian weaponry destined for Hezbollah. Israel knows that any unilateral involvement from their side outside a broader US-led coalition would harm US interests in the region and could even destroy all prospects for such a coalition. The Syrian conflict has divided the Arab world along Shiite-Sunni lines (Hezbollah, Iran and the Syrian ruling elite, the Alawites, are Shiites) and makes a rather unusual coalition of Western and Sunni Muslim countries possible which could eventually confront Iran itself.

This is also an important reason why the West has been so slow to become involved – the longer the conflict persists, the more permanent and inclusive the grouping opposing the regime would become (for other such reasons see [2]). On 16 June 2013, during a Sunni conference in Cairo, Egyptian president Morsi severed all ties with the regime in Damascus. Even Hamas, the Sunni Islamists in the Gaza strip along Israel's southern border, has separated from their previous allies Hezbollah and Iran after some Hamas fighters who joined the rebels were caught during the battle for Al-Qusayr.

Israel's primary security concern is with the danger of a nuclear-capable Iran. The Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said that Israel views such an Iran as an existential threat. Iran has installed 9000 centrifuges over the past two years at its enrichment facilities. Two recent studies have shown that Iran is close to having enough 20%-enriched nuclear material to built a bomb in the time between IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections. Israel knows that the chances of eliminating this threat on their own are small; an Israeli attack would set the Iranian program back a few years at best. The best option is to be part of a joined US-Israel attack on Iran which takes place within the framework of a broader Western-Muslim anti-Syria-Iran coalition. The fall of the Syrian regime (and the routing out of jihadic forces) would have the bonus of isolating Hezbollah in the region.

French strategic interests

France is also a very important player in this unfolding drama. In fact, the French have even a more direct interest in the outcome of the Syrian conflict than the US (that is, apart from the Iranian nuclear threat to Israel). The reason for this is that Syria lies in the EU's near-abroad. As a major EU country, it is of vital importance for France to promote stability and democracy in this region. This was also the reason for the French military involvement in Libya where it played a leading role in establishing a no-fly zone with its NATO allies and provided the rebels with weapons. More recently France was militarily involved in Mali where it routed out the jihadi groups in the North.

France has so far played a major role in encouraging the formation of the Syrian National Coalition as an inclusive government in waiting (something that has not been fully achieved) and was the first Western country to recognize it as such on 13 November 2012. It has established good relations with the fighters of the FSA and has provided them with non-lethal support. It will probably in the near-future start arming these rebels. France hopes that the fall of the Syrian regime (and routing out the jihadists) would lead to the formation of a democratic Islamist government in Syria.

Establishing such a government would be in line with their long-term plan to align the interests of the EU with those of the Muslim countries around the Mediterranean Sea. In 2008 France took the leading role in establishing the Union for the Mediterranean (which includes Syria). The French vision is probably that these countries would eventually in some way become part of the EU (such an EU would be a very strong player on the international scene).

Iran's strategic interests

The conflict in Syria allows Iran to project its power far into the Middle East as leader of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah Shiite alliance which is opposed to the West. Iran knows that the fall of the Syrian regime would deprive it of an important ally and would leave itself and its partner Hezbollah vulnerable and isolated in the region. Iran is therefore willing to go an extra mile to stop this from happening – especially since they have the tactic support of Russia. Even if the Syrian regime would eventually fall, Iran would still gain a lot by their involvement since it prolongs the conflict and makes any US-Israel attack more difficult. It buys them time.

The Iranians distrust the Western countries. They know that any substantial compromise on their part regarding their nuclear program would leave them more vulnerable to Western attack. In this regard, they take Libya as an example – shortly after Gaddafi disposed of his WMD (weapons of mass destruction) he was attacked by the Western powers. The Iranians believe that acquiring nuclear weapons would serve as a deterrent for any such attack. In that case, the Western countries (and especially Israel) would have to accept the outcome.

How should we interpret the election of Hassan Rouani as Iranian president on 15 June 2013? Although he is portrayed as a moderate, he is an old hand in the Iranian establishment with close ties to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, being a member of the Supreme National Security Council since 1989. It could well be that the Iranian strategy is to use his election as a ploy to prolong the nuclear negotiations with the 5+1 nations (the US, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China) in an effort to buy time.

The Russian strategic interests

Russia has steadfastly stood with the Syrian regime, providing them with billions of dollars of weaponry. I have predicted early in the conflict (before Putin's election [3]) that this would happen. This is the major reason why the Syrian regime is still in power and the crisis is prolonged. Why is Russia doing this in spite of all the war crimes committed by the Syrian regime? The main reason is geopolitical. Syria is the last bastion of Russian influence in the Middle East (except for Iran), being a Russian ally for a long time. Russia has a naval base for its Black Sea Fleet in Tartus which allows them to project their power into the Mediterranean Sea.

Under President Putin Russia has become ever more assertive, trying to stop the growing Western influence connected with the democratic impulse of the Arab Spring. The Syrian conflict provided him with the opportunity to project Russian power as a country that can stand up to the West (the Russian self-image seems to be in need of such assurance), using its military power to try and intimidate the Western powers into backing down on Syria (any attack on the S300 anti-aircraft systems will have to take the impact of casualties among the Russian personnel manning it into account).

Recently during the G8 summit in June 2013, it was clear to all the world that the relationship between Putin and Obama has become very strained. Putin knows that the fall of the Syrian regime would dramatically shift the balance of power in the Middle East, effectively excluding Russia from the region (except for Iran) and leading to a reduction in its influence. Putin's reasons for supporting the Syrian regime could also, at least in part, be opportunistic. He knows that any escalation of the conflict into a wider Middle Eastern war which includes Iran would lead to a dramatic rise in the oil price. And Russia is an important oil producer.

Conclusions

The Syrian conflict has escalated recently. Other role players like Hezbollah (and Iran for some time already) have become openly involved. Countries like the US, France and Britain have declared their intention to provide the FSA with weaponry (Qatar and Saudi-Arabia are already doing so for some time). But countries do not become involved in a war if they do not have strategic interests in doing so. In this essay, I have shown that the interests of the US, Israel and France are in agreement, as are those of Iran and Russia.

The most important issue in this regard is the Iranian enrichment program and their possible effort to acquire nuclear weapons. They believe that this is the only way to safeguard themselves against future attack. But it is exactly this possibility that forces Israel to take action. Israel will, however, not be able to eliminate this threat on their own. For this, they need the US. Although President Obama has seemingly for some time (during his first term) resisted this option, there has been a clear change of mind. The appointment of Susan Rice as National Security Adviser reflects this.

Attacking Iran will not be an easy enterprise. Iran would retaliate against US bases in the Gulf and against US allies. The Iranian involvement in the Syrian conflict makes such an attack even more difficult. At the same time, however, it also provides the opportunity to establish a wide-ranging anti-Syria-Iran coalition which is ready and willing to participate in such a war. And the establishment of no-fly zones over Syria or even along its border with Jordan could provide the space for the US and Israel to attack Iran.

Will it come to that? The fact that the Syrian conflict has escalated, that no peace-deal is in sight and that Russia is in no mood to compromise, do not bode well for the Middle East. It seems likely that this conflict will further escalate when the West starts supplying the rebels with more advanced weapons. And such an escalation could provide the stimulus for an attack against Iran. At that point, the Syrian conflict could easily evolve into a great regional war [1].

[1] Regarding the Anglo-American interest in a wider Middle Eastern war see: Predicting a war against Iran? - an inquiry into war and peace cycles

[2] Die stilte voor die storm?

[3] Oorlogswolke begin oor die Midde Ooste saampak

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. www.wmcloud.blogspot.com)

Predicting a war against Iran? - an inquiry into war and peace cycles

In this article I explore the hypothesis that war and peace follow each other as part of an ongoing, recurring cycle. Although such cycles could go back for centuries, I focus only on the last century. To sensibly describe such a cycle, I build on the work of earlier pioneers like professor Spykman from Yale University. If a cycle is defined as starting with a financial crisis and a serious economic downturn, followed by a great war and then a long period of economic boom, four such cycles could be distinguished for the period 1907-2007. I also ask the questions: why do such cycles occur in the first place, and what are the predictions that follow from it? An important prediction seems to be that a great war against Iran can be expected in the next few years.

Peace and war are unpredictable. This is what most people believe. But is this really the case? Some analysts are of the opinion that this is not what history - especially that of the wars in which the British participated - tells us. According to them there is a certain regularity according to which war and peace arrive on the scene. They distinguish a pattern of successive war and peace cycles that go back centuries. If this is true, the implications for our world could be profound? A model based on these cycles, for example, predicts a great war against Iran in the near future.

Early pioneers

In all studies – including those of international affairs – it is important to carefully evaluate historical trends, hoping to learn something useful that could help us to better understand the future. The important question is whether such trends are accidental, or if there are some patterns that underlay them. We can do the same in our study into the possible existence of recurring war and peace cycles. If we find evidence for the existence of such cycles, we can ask what such a model predicts for the future.

One of the most important studies ever conducted on war was done by Nicholas J. Spykman, Sterling Professor of International Relations at the Yale University. In his study, “America's Strategy in World Politics”, sponsored by the Yale Institute of International Studies and published in 1942, he came to the conclusion that some wars – those conducted by Britain – followed a clear cyclical pattern. According to him, the British policy of the previous centuries was characterized by “a constant succession of cycles of shifting partners, isolation, alliance and war”.

Prof. Spykman distinguished three types of wars that Britain participated in. The most important of these are the wars waged against countries that were considered, at that stage, to be the greatest competitors of Great Britain. The purpose of these wars was to ensure that Britain keeps the balance of power in Europe in her favour, restricting the political and territorial expansion of other nation states. For this purpose, military alliances were formed that were stronger than those of Britain's opponents. These alliances changed continually with the changing international political situation. Over time, these wars formed part of a pattern of cycles of wars. The second type of wars is those that set the stage for the next great war. The third type was conducted to gain control of strategic sources.

According to him, the following wars formed part of the cycles of war:

1. The Napoleonic War of 1793-1815 against France
2. The Turkish War of 1827-1829 against Turkey (and Egypt)
3. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 against Russia, (Prussia) and the USA
4. The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 against Russia
5. The Spanish-American War of 1898-1899 against Spain (and Germany)
6. The First World War of 1914-1918 against Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria
7. The Second World War of 1939-1945 against Germany, Japan, Hungary, (Italy) etc.

In his book entitled “The Empire of 'The City', the Jekyll/Hyde nature of the British Government” (1946), E.C. Knuth wrote that the real hand behind these wars were the financial magnates of the City of London. According to him they are effectively concealed behind the Bank of England (which is in private hands), operating in the name of the “Crown”. He mentioned especially Lord Rothschild, whose role in this regard is well documented by the British premier David Lloyd George (1916-1922) in his book “Better Times”.

According to Knuth, these financial magnates are also concealed behind institutions such as the IMF and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, set up at Bretton Woods in the USA in 1944 (Together with the International Development Association, established in 1960, it now forms the "World Bank"). According to the statues of these organizations they are effectively above the law, immune against all law actions to search, confiscate or alienate anything from them.

Knuth also called attention to the involvement of the French in all the British cyclical wars since the time of the Napoleonic War (1793-1815). According to him, this involvement stemmed from the power that the French financial oligarchy, under the leadership of Baron Edouard de Rothschild, exercised over the French. I must mention that this British-French alliance came to an end with President De Gaulle, who withdrew France from the integrated military command structure of NATO. It was only recently (in 2010) renewed by President Sarkozy. Knuth mentioned that the British financial magnates around Cecil Rhodes also concluded an alliance with their American counterparts in 1902. This alliance is well documented by the historian, Professor Carroll Quigley, in his book “The Anglo-American Establishment” (1949). This alliance holds to this day.

Although I have until now focused on wars, these financial magnates of the City and Wall Street, are obviously also important role players in the world's money markets. The supposed war and peace cycles are accordingly also closely connected with the world economy. Another book that focuses mainly on this economic aspect, is “War Cycles, Peace Cycles” (1985) by Richard Kelly Hoskins. According to him the typical war and peace cycle is 50 years long, implying that it is a “jubilee cycle”. He distinguishes a period of high prices and economic boom as well as a period of low prices, depression/recession and war. His work shows some agreement with (and is probably based on) the well-known Kondratiev (also called Kondratieff) economic wave theory which postulates 50-60 year economic cycles.

Although there are many other authors who have written about these things, these are sufficient for our purposes. Since some of the above-mentioned authors wrote some time ago, it is an open question if these cycles still occur today. In this article I propose that, although there is a large element of contingency in the world markets and economy, it does, in fact, seem that such cycles exist. To find them, however, one should not focus on economics, but rather on the war cycles that are embedded within the economic cycles. Furthermore, both periods of war and peace are inseparable parts of the same cycle.

War and peace cycles

It follows from the work of the above-mentioned authors that war and peace cycles incorporate two consecutive periods in one cycle, namely one of financial crisis, economic downturn and war, and one of economic growth and boom. In this study into the possible existence of these cycles, I focused only on the events of the last century.

I suppose that the war phase of the cycle typically commences with a financial crisis, followed by a recession/depression and a period of economic stagnation. Thereafter occurs a great war against one of the most important imperialistic competitors of the Anglo-Americans. Sometimes the initial crisis is followed by a short period with some economic growth, but eventually it results in a recession, after which the war starts. During the war there is a concerted effort (not always successful) to restrict and reduce the power of their most important political and economic competitors and to promote the Anglo-American political-territorial interests. A new balance of power is also established with the purpose of keeping the most important role players in check.

As for the peace phase, it starts directly after the war. It is typically characterized by a post-war recession (a “reconversion crisis”), followed by a prolonged period of economic growth and boom. During this period some mild economic downturns may occur, but on the whole, it is a long period of growth. Although it is called a peace phase, some of the other types of war (mentioned earlier) do occur during this period, through which the scene for the next great war is set up. During the peace phase, the objective is to include as many countries as possible in the framework of world trade with the purpose to maximize the gains of the Anglo-American financial magnates, who pursue a policy of free trade.

I was able to distinguish four such war and peace cycles since the beginning of the previous century. Since the USA became the senior partner after the First World War, I focused mainly on their role during this period.

1. This cycle starts with the panic of 1907 and the recession of 1907-8 in the Western World. During this time the USA experienced a 31% decline in business activity. This was followed by the recessions of 1910-11 and 1913-14. The events of 1907 culminated in the 1914 law that established the Federal Reserve Bank (in private hands) in the USA. In Britain the 1913 depression was especially severe. Then followed the First World War of 1914-18 during which Germany was the most important imperialistic opponent. The war stimulated growth in the USA economy. Britain was not so lucky, and came out of the war with an enormous debt, followed by the post-war depression of 1919-21. In the USA the years 1921-1929 was good years, known as the “roaring twenties”. This period lasted 22 years.
2. This cycle starts with the stock market crash of 1929. This was followed by the “Great Depression” of 1929-1933, during which the USA GDP declined by 26.7%. The global economic stagnation persisted until the late 30's and into the recession of 1937. Then the Second World War (1939-45) broke out, again against Germany and her allies. At the post-war Yalta Conference, the balance of power for the next few decades was established. The war again stimulated growth in the USA economy.  The years 1945-56 were for the most part a period of economic growth; especially during the “booming years” of the early 50's. This was interrupted in 1953 by a mild recession (the post-Korean War recession). The period lasted 28 years.

3. This cycle does not commence with a crisis because a “no-panic” consensus existed in financial circles. Still, the global recession of 1957-8 was the worst since the Great Depression. The economic stagnation persisted until the early 1960's. In 1961 the USA concluded a military treaty with the South-Vietnamese government. The first support troops were sent in 1961 and were thereafter constantly increased until 1965 when the USA became directly involved in this Cold War era conflict. (As co-chair of the Geneva Convention, Britain was not able to participate in this war. Classified documents show, however, that Britain was in fact clandestinely involved.) This war was mainly targeted against the USSR – which was substantially, although indirectly, involved – to curtain their expansion. No direct confrontation between the main opposing powers took place (as was the case during the earlier wars) because both had nuclear weapons. During the years 1961-69 the USA economy grew again. In 1973 (when the USA involvement in the war stopped), the first oil crisis occurred. This led to a recession followed by a further period of growth. The period lasted 22 years.

4. This period starts with the second energy crisis of 1979, followed by the global recession(s) of 1980-82. The 1981-2 recession is considered the worse since the Great Depression. In 1982 the Latin-American sovereign debt crisis also intensified dramatically. In my view, the well-known speech by President Ronald Reagan in 1982, in which he described the USSR, who was the great enemy of NATO, as “totalitarian evil”, should be viewed as the start of this "war".  It led to a dramatic intensification of the Cold War. Thereafter the military spending of the USA military grew enormously and with it their economy (1982-90). (On the other side of the world, the two enemies also fought each other, although indirectly, in Afghanistan.) After the fall of Communism in 1989-91, the longest period of growth in American history ensued. This was interrupted by the dot.com crisis (the stock market dipped a lot, but the accompanying recession was mild), with another period of strong growth. The period lasted 28 years.
5. This cycle starts with the financial crisis of 2007 and the Great Recession of 2008-9, the worst since the Great Depression. It ignited the EU sovereign debt crisis that persists to this day.

From this analysis it follows that war and peace cycles, which include both phases, lasted 25 years on average. The average length of the war phase is 13.7 years, and the peace phase, 11.2 years. This corresponds quite well with the average period between the commencement of the various great wars, which followed each other with predictable regularity, namely 23 years (this includes all 9 wars since the Napoleonic War of 1793). This period is about the half of Hoskins's 50-year cycle (or the Kondratiev wave), which imply that he effectively combined two cycles in one.

The recessions/depressions with which the cycles start (1907-8, 1929-33, 1957-58, 1980-82, 2008-9), which preceded the previous great wars, are not only neatly spaced in time with 22-28 years between them; it also represents the worst economic downturns of the past 100 years. It is clear that during each war, the military-industrial complex was responsible for the concurrent growth in the Anglo-American economies. (Countries like China use large infrastructure projects to drive economic growth.) The wars also promoted the financial interests of the Anglo-American financial magnates at the expense of their major opponents in other countries. It seems clear that the cycles did not stop at the time of the Second World War, but continues to this day. It is, however, important to note that the use of nuclear weapons changed the structure of the conflicts, with no direct confrontation between die Anglo-American allies and their opponent (the USSR) taking place since the Second World War.

Predicting a war against Iran?

According to my analysis of the war and peace cycles, the present cycle started in 2007. From the trends in the previous cycles, it seems that a further mild recession, followed by another great war, can be expected. When will this next great war start? The average time from the beginning of the cycles (with the financial crises) to the outbreak of the wars (or the involvement of the Anglo-Americans therein) was seven years for the previous four cycles. From this we can conclude that 2014 represents the most likely date for the outbreak of such a war. If we take into consideration that it has been 30 years since the intensification of the Cold War, which is considerably longer than the average of 23 years between the outbreak of these wars, then it seems that this war can start even earlier. (The first two wars that were taken into consideration commenced 34 years apart so the period may be longer).

It is not difficult to predict which country would be the next target of the Anglo-American war machine. It is Iran. At this stage, Iran presents the greatest danger to the Anglo-American interests in the Middle East – especially because they may soon have nuclear weapons. As with all the previous opponents of this group, Iran has imperialistic intentions and support countries and groups outside their borders who are hostile towards the West.

In recent times the Anglo-Americans have conducted (as expected) various wars through which the stage for a war with Iran has been set up – the two Gulf Wars, the war in Afghanistan and the Libyan War (all of these are wars of the second and third type). Two neighbouring countries, namely Iraq and Afghanistan, now have good relations with the USA (although Iraq is more open to Iranian influences since the withdrawal of American troops at the end of 2011). USA troops are also stationed all around Iran, in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen and Saudi-Arabia. Saudi-Arabia, Libya and Iraq will ensure that the West has access to enough oil during such a conflict.  Since the European economy is seriously impacted by the present economic crisis, I expect that Britain and France will take a leading role during such a war (to stimulate growth in the European economy).

I do not think that the Anglo-Americans will try to eliminate Iran as an enemy. The inclusion of various Arab countries in their coalition (those where the revolutions were successful, who are moving towards democracy) rests on the continuation of the Iranian threat. It is quite possible that such a war against Iran will be the first of a series of wars, in the same way that two World Wars were conducted against Germany and two great wars were conducted against the USSR – the Vietnam War and the (intensification of the) Cold War. After a war against Iran, a new balance of power will be established between the great powers in the Middle East (the USA, EU and Russia). One can expect Syria to eventually become part of the western sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Nobody knows the future. This is also not an attempt to predict the future. What I do in this article, is to study the historical war and peace cycles with the intention of determining if there is enough evidence for the existence of such cycles. My conclusion is that such cycles seem to exist. Although there is an element of contingency, it is possible to use the recurring elements to construct a model that one could use to make certain informed predictions about the future. On the basis of this model, we can expect another economic downturn – typically occurring just before the outbreak of the war – as well as a great war thereafter. Other considerations show that Iran is the most likely Anglo-American opponent against whom such a war will be conducted. It furthermore seems that such a war can be expected in the next few years.

If these predictions are correct, we will have more confidence in the existence of war and peace cycles. It will imply that we do not simply read these patterns into history; they probably exist. If this is so, we can also study other aspects of the cycle more carefully.

Author: Dr. Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)