Showing posts with label english. Show all posts
Showing posts with label english. Show all posts

Tuesday, 1 May 2012

Faith and reason - finding the balance.

God laid a great task upon humans -
to integrate the practical experience of their faith
with the prevalent intellectual perspective of the world. 

Since the early days of Christianity, there were two clearly identifiable streams present, namely those who practised an essentially existentialist faith and those who accentuated the reasonable aspect of their belief.  The first group had their roots in the early Jewish church and accentuated a practical intimate experience with God. The second had its roots in the Greek, especially Platonic, philosophy and used a more rational approach towards believing. To this day these currents are visible in Christianity. Today, more than before, it is a great challenge for Christians to integrate their faith with reason. How could they accomplish this? In this essay, I discuss the possibilities for doing so.

An existentialist faith

What is existentialist faith? It a trust in God which is practised and experienced in all aspects of daily life. This faith normally flows from a particular commitment to God. For such believers, this is a way of life - spirituality is at the centre of their whole existence. For them, it makes little sense to speak about spirituality if you do not experience it. The heart of spirituality is experience - the experience of God and his presence in a very intimate, intuitive way.  This practical experience of Christian living is described by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1955), who accentuated his existential faith - at a time when rationality was overshadowing all other aspects of human life.  From an existentialist point of view, science will never be able to give final answers. All knowledge is provisional - but faith is grounded in God.

This existential faith includes the desire to make a difference (it is, in fact, a very basic human desire). In a Christian context, this manifests itself primarily as the desire to bring others to faith in Christ. To share one's experience and motivate others to also commit themselves to God. Although there is a way in which this could be done on a purely existential level, these believers typically find themselves confronted by a barrier - most people do not easily believe if they are not convinced. They must believe that the Biblical message is trustworthy (see Paul's writings in this regard in Romans 10:14; 1 Tim. 1:15; also Mark 4:12). And to be convinced - especially in the present scientific era that we live in - these Christians need to argue, to use reason, to convince others. Although they ground their faith in an existential relation with God, they need reason to bring others to a similar faith. Like Paul, when he argued with the Greek philosophers in Athens.

Since most of these existential believers do not accentuate reason - for them it is not really important what science thinks - this aspect of their humanness is not very well developed. Having feelings of uncertainty result in them seeing the world around them, which operates for the most part according to reason, as a threat - even as a danger.  To reinforce their faith, to guard their views against arguments that they are not able to answer, these believers use all sorts of rules and laws to protect themselves and their community against the outside world - which often results in them leading very legalistic lives. And this strategy is indeed very effective in protecting them against arguments from atheistic thinkers like Richard Dawkins - they do not read such books or watch movies [1].

But this strategy is not particularly successful in convincing other people to commit to such an existential faith. For outsiders, their arguments are typically not convincing enough and the legalistic practice of their faith pushes them away.  For these reasons such groups normally decline numerically in a scientifically oriented world.  In those parts of society where people are not really well educated, a strategy of promoting existential faith through, for example, "signs and wonders", could still yield good results. But this is becoming an ever smaller part of society. Another strategy, one born of desperation, is to work and pray for a religious revival which is probably the most dramatic expression of existential faith. This is surely a good ideal, but these are very scarce nowadays.

An intellectual belief 

What is "intellectual belief"? This is a set of religious convictions which grow out of intellectual reasoning.  During earlier epochs, when the ancient worldview was still prevalent, intellectual Christians used reason not only to formulate their belief but also to argue for it against the prevalent non-Christian views of the time. Many of the early Christian fathers were educated in Greek philosophy. This led to the rise of Christian philosophy - especially of the Augustinian (derived from Platonic philosophy) and Thomist (referring to Thomas Aquinas and derived from Aristotelian philosophy) varieties. With the rise of science - the rational-empirical study of things which requires physical proof - it became clear that it is impossible to prove the existence of God. But the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), himself a Christian, argued that there are certain limits to pure reason - that is, to what extent pure reason can arrive at real (empirical) knowledge [2]. And this allows for faith to exist next to reason. Although we could rationally argue for our faith, we will never be able to prove it in any scientific sense.

For the intellectual Christian, it is nonetheless important to find a rational basis for his or her faith. They do not have a problem to accept the basic scientific views about the world, although they reject the view that science has (or will ever have) all the answers. We find these Christians - mostly Christian philosophers and theologians - often in debates with atheists. They try to show that Christianity is compatible with the scientific worldview. They try to convince people in the wider public space about the viability of present-day Christianity. And we do find that some intellectuals, struggling to reconcile the Christian belief in which they were brought up with the scientific worldview (or post-modern worldview for that matter), eventually settles for some form of that belief to which they can adhere to.

Since "belief" is in some sense the balance between faith and reason, these Christians end up with a form of intellectual belief. They are able to reconcile their Christian views with the current scientific worldview, but their focus on reason often draw them away from any true experimental faith. In this regard they experience a problem in their desire to make a difference, namely that convincing people intellectually is not enough to bring them to faith in God; if people do not see the practical experience of Christian living, they will not easily commit to it. Although the reasonableness of the Christian faith is important to bring people to that faith, it is not enough - what is also needed is the experience of faith in a personal and powerful way.

A reasonable faith

It seems that the most rewarding form of Christian life is when faith and reason are both fully part of our lives. It is not only rewarding in the sense that such a person can experience the joy of practical faith in the framework of intellectual integrity but also in the sense that such a person could be successful in his or her existential desire to make a difference. Although we understand that all human knowledge is partial and temporary, we also know that people's intellect requires convincing them of the trustworthiness of the Christian faith. At the same time, their spiritual needs require a grounding in practical faith. But how is this balance accomplished in us?

During the modernist epoch, some thinkers not only expressed dismay at the over-accentuation of reason but also argued for some synthesis between opposites. One can think of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who expressed his rejection of the non-existentialist reason-dominated state-Christianity of his time in a powerful way. He proposed a synthesis of the "Apollonian" (rational) and "Dionysian" (non-rational, unconscious, including intuition). Nietzsche accentuated the instinctive drives within the framework of the "Dionysian"; it is passion that drives this synthesis. Later Carl Jung (1875-1961) also formulated his theories on the synthesis of "consciousness" (rational) and "unconsciousness" (non-rational, including intuition). It is interesting that these men saw themselves as philosopher/scientist-psychologists. This shows their deep conviction that the intellect should be integrated with the more basic aspects of our existence, leading to "wisdom" (Nietzsche) or a "deeper consciousness"/an integrated self (Jung) [3].

These insights are valuable to Christian living. Both the intellect and the deeper non-rational faculties should be integrated to form a "complete" person. Reason and intuition (faith is intuitive trust) are not disconnected faculties - they are interconnected in a fundamental way so that their development and integration into a balanced harmony forms part of the process of spiritual growth. Their interconnectedness is clearly manifested in Christian life - our rational arguments about God are grounded in the intuitive trust in God's supernatural revelation in Scripture and in Jesus Christ, whereas our intuitive experience of God is grounded in our rational notions about God's existence and His workings in humans. It is only when both the intellect and the inner intuitive experience of God are synthesized, that the ideal of the Christian who is both "wise" and "spiritual" could be realized. It is only when the church accentuate both the practical experience of existential faith as well as intellectual excellence that it will have a real and lasting impact on society.

The desire to make a difference, the passion to be useful to God, should be present if we want to grow towards wholeness - this brings value and meaning to our lives.  In each of us, this passion manifests itself in a different vocation, leading us along different routes. The details of the route to wholeness differ for everyone - no two persons follow the same route. It is a lifelong journey, which is never fully accomplished. There could be times when the apparent conflict between faith and reason will lead one into the dark valley of doubt. It is important, however, to keep the practical experience of faith alive. It implies that one should keep praying - even when one feels no desire to do so. This kindles the flame of faith - even in the darkest hours of the intellectual struggle about one's faith. During this time we gain insights (maybe some metaphor that comes to mind will be of value) that enable us to overcome. With these insights we can sensibly integrate our faith with our reasoning, allowing the process of growth to proceed.

With intellectual growth comes freedom from all the many rules and regulations of legalistic faith, but this freedom is contained within the boundaries of a spiritual relationship with God. With spiritual growth comes the deeply personal intuitive knowledge of God that enables us to overcome and be victorious in all circumstances. As we develop our own perspectives, the potential for conflict with long-held communal views will force us to involve others in our own process of growth - some will resist change, but others will accompany us on the journey.

With time each one of us should develop into "spiritual-wise" persons who could contribute in a unique and special way to the growth of the Christian community where we are active. In this way, we would follow in the footsteps of many others whose lives and wisdom had an impact on our own.  Eventually, we will come to enjoy the pure experience of the Christ-like life in the fullest sense of the word.

Sources

[1] Pardi, Paul F. 2010. "Kierkegaard and the Modern Religious Mind". On the internet: http://www.philosophynews.com/post/2010/12/29/Kierkegaard-and-the-Modern-Religious-Mind.aspx. This essay forms part of a series on faith and reason, focusing on the existentialist perspective.

[2] Ward, A. 2006. Kant. The Three Critiques. Cambridge: Polity Press. Ward gives a good overview of the Kantian perspective - if one does not want to read Kant himself, which is of course preferable.

[3] Nietzsche and Jung. 1999. Sailing a Deeper Night. Contemporary Existentialism, Vol 3. New York: Peter Lang. p 50. This is one of the best books that I have read on Nietzsche and his influence on Jung.

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud
 www.wmcloud.blogspot.com

This article was followed by a debate between Willie Mc Loud and Cornelis Malan (MA Philosophy) from Southern Evangelical Seminary in the US) on www.wmcloud.blogspot.com. 

Tuesday, 6 March 2012

The euro countries move towards a fiscal union – an eschatological perspective

On Friday, 2 March 2012, 25 of the 27 EU countries accepted a fiscal compact that has important implications for the future of the European Union.  It allows the 17 euro countries (who share the euro as currency) to partially upgrade their monetary union to a fiscal union.  This effectively brings about a multi-speed European Union – some countries like Britain sit out while the others proceed to further integrate their economies.  I have foreseen these events in my book on the Arabic uprisings in August 2011 (“Die Arabiese Opstande”). From an eschatological perspective (i.e. the study of the end times), this event is of great importance since it could well be an important step towards the eventual formation of a restored Roman Empire, which will arise on the scene in the end times according to Bible prophecy.

After the British prime minister David Cameron stormed out of a meeting of European leaders on 8 December 2011, it buzzed in media circles about a so-called “multi-speed” European Union (EU) coming into being.  This event, which left Britain on the sidelines, has been described as “a major turning point in the history of the EU”. Since then the EU has been divided into two groups, namely a core that proceeds with further integration and an outer group, who follows Britain’s lead to sit out. With the signing of the fiscal compact on 2 March 2012 this multi-speed Europe is about to become a practical reality.

The basic framework of this multi-speed EU appeared years ago when a group of EU countries introduced the euro as currency – leaving the other EU countries whose economies were not ready, outside the eurozone. This resulted in two groups of EU countries, namely those that introduced the euro as currency (there are 17 euro countries at the moment) and those that kept their own currencies (there are 10 such countries at the moment).  This arrangement was agreed to within the framework of the EU and is regulated by European treaties that all EU countries agreed to.  The only difference today is that Britain does not aspire to join the eurozone any more.  As a result, Britain's objectives have become more and more removed from those of the other EU countries.

What makes the present fiscal compact, called the “Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance”, so important, is that it enables the other EU countries to proceed with the integration of their economies, even giving the European Commission some oversight over their budgets.  And this happens in spite of Britain’s opposition to it.  It allows a core group of countries to proceed with further integration – although not within the normal EU framework.  Even so, they may use the institutions of the European Union, like the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, to enforce this compact.  This development creates a precedent that has important implications for the future of the EU.  I will now discuss these as well as the eschatological implications thereof.

The fiscal compact of 2 March 2012

The fiscal compact that was signed by all the 17 euro countries, as well as eight other EU countries (excluding Britain and the Czech Republic), includes the following:

1.    The goal is to foster greater coordination of budgetary policy throughout the EU.  This will stop euro countries from falling into excessive debts that could endanger the future existence of the euro.
2.    All euro countries are compelled to write into law (preferably into their constitutions) that they are forced to pass “balanced” budgets.  Their debt may not exceed 0.5% of their GDP (gross domestic product).  These should include automatic brakes which, when activated, would lead to a correction.
3.    The European Commission will monitor the enforcement of the compact and countries that are suspected of bending the rules, could be brought before the European Court of Justice, who can impose a fine of up to 0.1% of GDP.
4.    Only the countries that sign the compact into law can borrow money from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – a permanent fund that is financed by the central banks of EU countries.  It will be established in June 2012.  This will force the EU countries to approve the compact as soon as possible.
5.    The compact will come into force when 12 of the 17 (i.e. 70 % of) euro countries have approved it.
6.    Although it is an intergovernmental treaty that is agreed to outside the formal EU treaties, it is compatible with EU law and is effectively managed by EU institutions.

The main reason why Britain rejected this compact, is that they are not willing to allow the European Commission to have oversight over their budget – and eventually also over financial institutions like the Bank of England in the City of London. (On the City, see my article posted on 8 January 2012 on this blog, “Predicting a war against Iran? An inquiry into war and peace cycles”.)  Although Britain could in principle veto the use of EU institutions to monitor the compact, they did not do so because that would have excluded them from any further involvement in the ongoing process of fiscal integration in the EU.  Such a step would also not stop the other countries from proceeding with their plans – it would only result in Britain losing its influence in the EU.

The implications of the fiscal compact

Although this compact will not result in a full fiscal union whereby the whole eurozone is managed as a single economy, it is still an important step in that direction.  Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank, said: “It is the first step toward a fiscal union”.  Various other measures are also foreseen for the future, including the issuing of euro bonds, underwritten by all euro countries, the enlargement of the ESM (the stability fund) to E 1000 billion, an expansion of the role of the European Central Bank (ESB) to become a lender of last resort (the ECB is already involved in buying the bonds of euro countries like Greece and Italy), as well as some form of financial tax.  Countries like Germany and France do not want to move too fast with this process of fiscal integration since that will reduce the pressure on countries with large debt burdens to restructure their economies.  The sword that hangs over those countries because of the present financial crisis is forcing them to make the necessary structural corrections that they will not otherwise do.

The most important outcome of this compact is that it allows a group of countries within the framework of the EU to proceed with further integration in spite of the opposition from other countries.  Although the compact falls outside the formal EU treaties, EU institutions like the European Commission, the EU Court of Justice en possibly the ECB (the central bank) are nevertheless involved in the implementation thereof.  It may well be that this compact sets a precedent according to which some euro countries could integrate even further in future, and still make use of EU institutions.  In this regard one could remind oneself of the objective stated in most of the previous EU treaties, namely to move towards “an ever closer union”.  One could think that a group of countries would eventually take the step towards a full political union, forming a “United States of Europe”.

What is also important, is that this treaty (in contrast with the EU treaties) come into force when enough (i.e. not all) countries have approved it. When the parliaments of 12 euro countries have approved it, it will come into force.  This solves the problem of treaties being stalled when they are rejected in some EU countries whose constitutions require referendums.  It is expected that other similar treaties will follow this example in future.  This will result in an acceleration of the process of integration within the framework of the eurozone.

Another important precedent set during the euro crisis is that unelected leaders came to power in those countries overwhelmed by the crisis, namely in Greece and Italy.  This could in future open the door for other leaders to use crisis situations to come to power.  Such crises would not necessarily be of a financial nature – think of military crises.  In the time of the Roman Republic, it was exactly during periods of military crises that the generals took over the reins – and this led to the establishment of the Roman Empire.

An eschatological perspective

Although this compact is but a small step on the way, the implications and the example set by it, are of great importance when it comes to the eschatological study of end time events.  In my book, “Die Arabiese Opstande” (The Arabic Uprisings) (Aug. 2011), I proposed that such a multi-speed Europe would come into being, allowing the euro countries to proceed with fiscal integration in spite of British resistance.  This is exactly what happened since December 2011.  I also mentioned in an article written during the height of the financial crisis (in contrast with the view of many other observers) that the crisis will not lead to the disintegration of the eurozone; it will rather lead to further integration of the eurozone (see the article posted on 10 October 2011 on this blog: “Gaan Griekeland in die Eurosone bly? - 'n eskatologiese perspektief). This is exactly what happened.

But why is a multi-speed EU important from an eschatological perspective?  The answer is simple: it allows some EU countries to proceed with integration, leaving others behind.  This could eventually lead to ten countries in the heart of Europe deciding to proceed towards full political integration – which will be a fulfilment of Bible prophecy that a kingdom of ten (symbolized as ten toes or horns) will arise in the end times within the framework of a restored Roman Empire.  Geographically speaking, the EU is already beginning to look more and more like such an empire. (See my article on 22 January 2012 on this blog: “Die tien horings van Daniël 7, waarna verwys dit?”).  When these countries appoint a leader over them, he could very well be the final Antichrist. In this regard, it is remarkable that the recent appointment of unelected leaders over some euro countries could set a precedent for the countries that proceed with political integration, to also appoint a leader over them. If the events from the time of the Roman Empire are an indication, one can expect someone like the Roman emperors of old to eventually come to power in the EU.

Final thoughts

The fiscal compact that was signed on 2 March 2012 is a very important event in the framework of the EU.  It allows a core group of countries to proceed towards a fiscal union, with their economies centrally managed – and that in spite of Britain's opposition.  It set a precedent according to which an even smaller group of countries could also eventually integrate politically.  It is in this regard that these events correspond with our expectations about the fulfillment of Bible prophecies – according to the prophecy in Daniel 7 about the ten horns (or the prophecy in Daniel 2 about the ten toes) there will eventually be a group of countries that will rise within the framework of a restored Roman Empire.  Furthermore, the appointment of unelected leaders in some euro countries sets a precedent according to which countries that integrate politically, could also appoint a leader over them.  This will agree with the prophecy according to which the mentioned ten “kings” will appoint a leader over them.  When such a person is appointed, and he (maybe not the first one to be appointed) begin to operate like the emperors of old – being above all presidents and kings – we can expect the time of the final Antichrist to be at hand.

Although the time of the end has not yet arrived, it is clear that the current events could be an important step in that direction.  We will have to wait and see how the situation unfolds further, and whether these prophecies will be fulfilled in our own time.

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud. (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

Sunday, 19 February 2012

Predicting a war against Iran? - an inquiry into war and peace cycles

In this article I explore the hypothesis that war and peace follow each other as part of an ongoing, recurring cycle. Although such cycles could go back for centuries, I focus only on the last century. To sensibly describe such a cycle, I build on the work of earlier pioneers like professor Spykman from Yale University. If a cycle is defined as starting with a financial crisis and a serious economic downturn, followed by a great war and then a long period of economic boom, four such cycles could be distinguished for the period 1907-2007. I also ask the questions: why do such cycles occur in the first place, and what are the predictions that follow from it? An important prediction seems to be that a great war against Iran can be expected in the next few years.

Peace and war are unpredictable. This is what most people believe. But is this really the case? Some analysts are of the opinion that this is not what history - especially that of the wars in which the British participated - tells us. According to them there is a certain regularity according to which war and peace arrive on the scene. They distinguish a pattern of successive war and peace cycles that go back centuries. If this is true, the implications for our world could be profound? A model based on these cycles, for example, predicts a great war against Iran in the near future.

Early pioneers

In all studies – including those of international affairs – it is important to carefully evaluate historical trends, hoping to learn something useful that could help us to better understand the future. The important question is whether such trends are accidental, or if there are some patterns that underlay them. We can do the same in our study into the possible existence of recurring war and peace cycles. If we find evidence for the existence of such cycles, we can ask what such a model predicts for the future.

One of the most important studies ever conducted on war was done by Nicholas J. Spykman, Sterling Professor of International Relations at the Yale University. In his study, “America's Strategy in World Politics”, sponsored by the Yale Institute of International Studies and published in 1942, he came to the conclusion that some wars – those conducted by Britain – followed a clear cyclical pattern. According to him, the British policy of the previous centuries was characterized by “a constant succession of cycles of shifting partners, isolation, alliance and war”.

Prof. Spykman distinguished three types of wars that Britain participated in. The most important of these are the wars waged against countries that were considered, at that stage, to be the greatest competitors of Great Britain. The purpose of these wars was to ensure that Britain keeps the balance of power in Europe in her favour, restricting the political and territorial expansion of other nation states. For this purpose, military alliances were formed that were stronger than those of Britain's opponents. These alliances changed continually with the changing international political situation. Over time, these wars formed part of a pattern of cycles of wars. The second type of wars is those that set the stage for the next great war. The third type was conducted to gain control of strategic sources.

According to him, the following wars formed part of the cycles of war:
  1. The Napoleonic War of 1793-1815 against France
  2. The Turkish War of 1827-1829 against Turkey (and Egypt)
  3. The Crimean War of 1853-1856 against Russia, (Prussia) and the USA
  4. The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 against Russia
  5. The Spanish-American War of 1898-1899 against Spain (and Germany)
  6. The First World War of 1914-1918 against Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria
  7. The Second World War of 1939-1945 against Germany, Japan, Hungary, (Italy) etc.
In his book entitled “The Empire of 'The City', the Jekyll/Hyde nature of the British Government” (1946), E.C. Knuth wrote that the real hand behind these wars were the financial magnates of the City of London. According to him they are effectively concealed behind the Bank of England (which is in private hands), operating in the name of the “Crown”. He mentioned especially Lord Rothschild, whose role in this regard is well documented by the British premier David Lloyd George (1916-1922) in his book “Better Times”.

According to Knuth, these financial magnates are also concealed behind institutions such as the IMF and the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, set up at Bretton Woods in the USA in 1944 (Together with the International Development Association, established in 1960, it now forms the "World Bank"). According to the statues of these organizations they are effectively above the law, immune against all law actions to search, confiscate or alienate anything from them.

Knuth also called attention to the involvement of the French in all the British cyclical wars since the time of the Napoleonic War (1793-1815). According to him, this involvement stemmed from the power that the French financial oligarchy, under the leadership of Baron Edouard de Rothschild, exercised over the French. I must mention that this British-French alliance came to an end with President De Gaulle, who withdrew France from the integrated military command structure of NATO. It was only recently (in 2010) renewed by President Sarkozy. Knuth mentioned that the British financial magnates around Cecil Rhodes also concluded an alliance with their American counterparts in 1902. This alliance is well documented by the historian, Professor Carroll Quigley, in his book “The Anglo-American Establishment” (1949). This alliance holds to this day.

Although I have until now focused on wars, these financial magnates of the City and Wall Street, are obviously also important role players in the world's money markets. The supposed war and peace cycles are accordingly also closely connected with the world economy. Another book that focuses mainly on this economic aspect, is “War Cycles, Peace Cycles” (1985) by Richard Kelly Hoskins. According to him the typical war and peace cycle is 50 years long, implying that it is a “jubilee cycle”. He distinguishes a period of high prices and economic boom as well as a period of low prices, depression/recession and war. His work shows some agreement with (and is probably based on) the well-known Kondratiev (also called Kondratieff) economic wave theory which postulates 50-60 year economic cycles.

Although there are many other authors who have written about these things, these are sufficient for our purposes. Since some of the above-mentioned authors wrote some time ago, it is an open question if these cycles still occur today. In this article I propose that, although there is a large element of contingency in the world markets and economy, it does, in fact, seem that such cycles exist. To find them, however, one should not focus on economics, but rather on the war cycles that are embedded within the economic cycles. Furthermore, both periods of war and peace are inseparable parts of the same cycle.

War and peace cycles

It follows from the work of the above-mentioned authors that war and peace cycles incorporate two consecutive periods in one cycle, namely one of financial crisis, economic downturn and war, and one of economic growth and boom. In this study into the possible existence of these cycles, I focused only on the events of the last century.

I suppose that the war phase of the cycle typically commences with a financial crisis, followed by a recession/depression and a period of economic stagnation. Thereafter occurs a great war against one of the most important imperialistic competitors of the Anglo-Americans. Sometimes the initial crisis is followed by a short period with some economic growth, but eventually it results in a recession, after which the war starts. During the war there is a concerted effort (not always successful) to restrict and reduce the power of their most important political and economic competitors and to promote the Anglo-American political-territorial interests. A new balance of power is also established with the purpose of keeping the most important role players in check.

As for the peace phase, it starts directly after the war. It is typically characterized by a post-war recession (a “reconversion crisis”), followed by a prolonged period of economic growth and boom. During this period some mild economic downturns may occur, but on the whole, it is a long period of growth. Although it is called a peace phase, some of the other types of war (mentioned earlier) do occur during this period, through which the scene for the next great war is set up. During the peace phase, the objective is to include as many countries as possible in the framework of world trade with the purpose to maximize the gains of the Anglo-American financial magnates, who pursue a policy of free trade.

I was able to distinguish four such war and peace cycles since the beginning of the previous century. Since the USA became the senior partner after the First World War, I focused mainly on their role during this period.
  1. This cycle starts with the panic of 1907 and the recession of 1907-8 in the Western World. During this time the USA experienced a 31% decline in business activity. This was followed by the recessions of 1910-11 and 1913-14. The events of 1907 culminated in the 1914 law that established the Federal Reserve Bank (in private hands) in the USA. In Britain the 1913 depression was especially severe. Then followed the First World War of 1914-18 during which Germany was the most important imperialistic opponent. The war stimulated growth in the USA economy. Britain was not so lucky, and came out of the war with an enormous debt, followed by the post-war depression of 1919-21. In the USA the years 1921-1929 was good years, known as the “roaring twenties”. This period lasted 22 years.
  2. This cycle starts with the stock market crash of 1929. This was followed by the “Great Depression” of 1929-1933, during which the USA GDP declined by 26.7%. The global economic stagnation persisted until the late 30's and into the recession of 1937. Then the Second World War (1939-45) broke out, again against Germany and her allies. At the post-war Yalta Conference, the balance of power for the next few decades was established. The war again stimulated growth in the USA economy.  The years 1945-56 were for the most part a period of economic growth; especially during the “booming years” of the early 50's. This was interrupted in 1953 by a mild recession (the post-Korean War recession). The period lasted 28 years.
  1. This cycle does not commence with a crisis because a “no-panic” consensus existed in financial circles. Still, the global recession of 1957-8 was the worst since the Great Depression. The economic stagnation persisted until the early 1960's. In 1961 the USA concluded a military treaty with the South-Vietnamese government. The first support troops were sent in 1961 and were thereafter constantly increased until 1965 when the USA became directly involved in this Cold War era conflict. (As co-chair of the Geneva Convention, Britain was not able to participate in this war. Classified documents show, however, that Britain was in fact clandestinely involved.) This war was mainly targeted against the USSR – which was substantially, although indirectly, involved – to curtain their expansion. No direct confrontation between the main opposing powers took place (as was the case during the earlier wars) because both had nuclear weapons. During the years 1961-69 the USA economy grew again. In 1973 (when the USA involvement in the war stopped), the first oil crisis occurred. This led to a recession followed by a further period of growth. The period lasted 22 years.
  1. This period starts with the second energy crisis of 1979, followed by the global recession(s) of 1980-82. The 1981-2 recession is considered the worse since the Great Depression. In 1982 the Latin-American sovereign debt crisis also intensified dramatically. In my view, the well-known speech by President Ronald Reagan in 1982, in which he described the USSR, who was the great enemy of NATO, as “totalitarian evil”, should be viewed as the start of this "war".  It led to a dramatic intensification of the Cold War. Thereafter the military spending of the USA military grew enormously and with it their economy (1982-90). (On the other side of the world, the two enemies also fought each other, although indirectly, in Afghanistan.) After the fall of Communism in 1989-91, the longest period of growth in American history ensued. This was interrupted by the dot.com crisis (the stock market dipped a lot, but the accompanying recession was mild), with another period of strong growth. The period lasted 28 years.
  2. This cycle starts with the financial crisis of 2007 and the Great Recession of 2008-9, the worst since the Great Depression. It ignited the EU sovereign debt crisis that persists to this day.
From this analysis it follows that war and peace cycles, which include both phases, lasted 25 years on average. The average length of the war phase is 13.7 years, and the peace phase, 11.2 years. This corresponds quite well with the average period between the commencement of the various great wars, which followed each other with predictable regularity, namely 23 years (this includes all 9 wars since the Napoleonic War of 1793). This period is about the half of Hoskins's 50-year cycle (or the Kondratiev wave), which imply that he effectively combined two cycles in one.

The recessions/depressions with which the cycles start (1907-8, 1929-33, 1957-58, 1980-82, 2008-9), which preceded the previous great wars, are not only neatly spaced in time with 22-28 years between them; it also represents the worst economic downturns of the past 100 years. It is clear that during each war, the military-industrial complex was responsible for the concurrent growth in the Anglo-American economies. (Countries like China use large infrastructure projects to drive economic growth.) The wars also promoted the financial interests of the Anglo-American financial magnates at the expense of their major opponents in other countries. It seems clear that the cycles did not stop at the time of the Second World War, but continues to this day. It is, however, important to note that the use of nuclear weapons changed the structure of the conflicts, with no direct confrontation between die Anglo-American allies and their opponent (the USSR) taking place since the Second World War.

Predicting a war against Iran?

According to my analysis of the war and peace cycles, the present cycle started in 2007. From the trends in the previous cycles, it seems that a further mild recession, followed by another great war, can be expected. When will this next great war start? The average time from the beginning of the cycles (with the financial crises) to the outbreak of the wars (or the involvement of the Anglo-Americans therein) was seven years for the previous four cycles. From this we can conclude that 2014 represents the most likely date for the outbreak of such a war. If we take into consideration that it has been 30 years since the intensification of the Cold War, which is considerably longer than the average of 23 years between the outbreak of these wars, then it seems that this war can start even earlier. (The first two wars that were taken into consideration commenced 34 years apart so the period may be longer).

It is not difficult to predict which country would be the next target of the Anglo-American war machine. It is Iran. At this stage, Iran presents the greatest danger to the Anglo-American interests in the Middle East – especially because they may soon have nuclear weapons. As with all the previous opponents of this group, Iran has imperialistic intentions and support countries and groups outside their borders who are hostile towards the West.

In recent times the Anglo-Americans have conducted (as expected) various wars through which the stage for a war with Iran has been set up – the two Gulf Wars, the war in Afghanistan and the Libyan War (all of these are wars of the second and third type). Two neighbouring countries, namely Iraq and Afghanistan, now have good relations with the USA (although Iraq is more open to Iranian influences since the withdrawal of American troops at the end of 2011). USA troops are also stationed all around Iran, in Afghanistan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Yemen and Saudi-Arabia. Saudi-Arabia, Libya and Iraq will ensure that the West has access to enough oil during such a conflict.  Since the European economy is seriously impacted by the present economic crisis, I expect that Britain and France will take a leading role during such a war (to stimulate growth in the European economy).

I do not think that the Anglo-Americans will try to eliminate Iran as an enemy. The inclusion of various Arab countries in their coalition (those where the revolutions were successful, who are moving towards democracy) rests on the continuation of the Iranian threat. It is quite possible that such a war against Iran will be the first of a series of wars, in the same way that two World Wars were conducted against Germany and two great wars were conducted against the USSR – the Vietnam War and the (intensification of the) Cold War. After a war against Iran, a new balance of power will be established between the great powers in the Middle East (the USA, EU and Russia). One can expect Syria to eventually become part of the western sphere of influence.

Conclusion

Nobody knows the future. This is also not an attempt to predict the future. What I do in this article, is to study the historical war and peace cycles with the intention of determining if there is enough evidence for the existence of such cycles. My conclusion is that such cycles seem to exist. Although there is an element of contingency, it is possible to use the recurring elements to construct a model that one could use to make certain informed predictions about the future. On the basis of this model, we can expect another economic downturn – typically occurring just before the outbreak of the war – as well as a great war thereafter. Other considerations show that Iran is the most likely Anglo-American opponent against whom such a war will be conducted. It furthermore seems that such a war can be expected in the next few years.

If these predictions are correct, we will have more confidence in the existence of war and peace cycles. It will imply that we do not simply read these patterns into history; they probably exist. If this is so, we can also study other aspects of the cycle more carefully.

Author: Dr. Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

Saturday, 2 July 2011

Kant’s noumenal realm reconsidered in the light of contemporary developments in physics

Philosophers have been uneasy about Kant’s notion of a noumenal realm existing alongside the phenomenal realm as part of our cosmos since the time when he first proposed it.  For them, it seemed that there is nothing to justify its existence.  In this essay, I, however, propose that Kant might have been right after all.  It seems quite possible that Kant’s noumenal realm could be identified with the higher dimensional structure of the universe that has been postulated in contemporary theoretical physics.  I look into the implications of such an identification.

Introduction

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is one of the great names in modern philosophy and he had an enormous influence on all later philosophers.  Even post-modern philosophy is to a large extent a reaction against the Kantian perspective, with regards to both his grounding of science as well as morality in the transcendental human subject.  Central to Kant’s philosophy is the concept of a “noumenal” realm in which the freedom to both think and act are situated.  Although we could not gain any true knowledge about this realm, not even about the existence thereof, he did postulate it to account for the human ability to both creatively imagine and freely act in accordance with the moral law (and thus be responsible for one’s actions). 

The possible existence of a noumenal realm in a realist sense was, however, increasingly viewed as an unlikely possibility.  Shortly after Kant philosophers started rejecting this in their philosophy.  But was Kant wrong?  In this essay, I propose that Kant might be right after all!  In contemporary physics, it has been theorized that, even though our perception of the world is restricted to the four normal space-time dimensions, there could be other higher dimensions interwoven in the cosmos to which we have no access.  This higher dimensional structure of the cosmos corresponds to a remarkable degree with the noumenal realm that Kant postulated.  If we allow for this identification the implications for philosophy are profound.

In this essay I first give a broad overview of Kant’s view, focusing on his perspective regarding the phenomenal and noumenal realms.  I discuss the implications of both the non-existence as well as the existence of the noumenal realm.  I show why the noumenal realm could be identified with the higher dimensional structure of the universe.  I also make some proposals as to how Kant’s views, which were formulated in a Newtonian framework, could be logically adapted to incorporate contemporary developments in theoretical physics.  When this is done, Kant’s philosophy could provide a powerful framework within which the contemporary developments in physics could be interpreted.  Finally, some implications of this approach are discussed.            
         
Phenomena and noumena

According to Kant our world in its totality could be divided into two parts, namely the world that we empirically observe, consisting of all sorts of things, called phenomena or appearances, and an underlying part which is inaccessible to our senses and in which the “things in themselves” (as they in essence really are), called noumena, are situated.  The things in themselves (noumena) form the basis in which things (phenomena) are grounded.  Kant wrote in the Critique of Practical Reason: “Letting objects of experience as such, including even our own subject, hold only as appearances but at the same time… putting things in themselves at their basis” (Kant 1997:5).  Kant also refers to these as the supersensible and sensible, or the archetypal and ectypal worlds: “The former [supersensible] could be called the archetypal world (natura archetypa) which we cognize only in reason, whereas the latter [sensible] could be called the ectypal world (natura ectypa) because it contains the possible effect of the idea of the former” (Kant 1997:39).  

As with all objects, humans are situated in both worlds.  Thus they could view themselves under two different, even contradictory, aspects, namely as phenomena subject to the laws of nature (especially of causality), situated in normal time and space, but also as noumena which could be thought of as subject to other laws (especially of freedom), situated outside normal time and space (Tarnas 1991:352).  Andrews Reath says: ”The distinction between appearances and things in themselves, along with the claim that spatio-temporal properties and laws do not represent objects as they are in themselves, creates room for the thought of noumenal objects subject to laws that are different in kind from those governing spatio-temporal events” (Kant 1997:xi).

Humans are capable of comprehending the world because they have a priori interpretive principles or forms of thought called “categories of the understanding” (for example of cause and effect, substance, quantity, relation) which unite the manifold given in intuition in consciousness (Kant 1934:186; Tarnas 1991:344).  Kant allowed two types of intuitions, namely intellectual and sensible intuitions, which are directed towards the noumenal and phenomenal worlds respectively (Kant 1934:187).  Noumena are objects of intellectual intuitions (Kant 1934:187l; i.e. a direct intellectual access not possible for humans). They are not necessarily grounding appearances (one could think of God or angels) (Ward 2006:102).  Since they are unschematized (i.e. they could not be placed in normal space and time), they are not determinate objects. 

The only intuitions that could lead to real knowledge are the sensible ones.  The mind is only able to place such intuitions of phenomenal objects (“things”) within the normal space-time framework, allowing them from a human perspective to obtain “objective” existence (Kant 1934:190; Caygill 1995:394).  This means that pure reason is restricted in its ability to provide valid knowledge; it could only provide knowledge of the empirical world of phenomena. In this way, Kant established the boundaries of the application of pure reason.  Science could never attain knowledge of all of reality – the things as they are in themselves are outside its reach.  This, however, does not mean that we cannot think things in themselves.  We can.  But, as Kant said in the Critique of Pure Reason: “[They] must ever remain unknown to us” (Kant 1934:190).  We can at most “belief” that such things exist.

Although humans are restricted in their use of pure reason, Kant proposed another form of reason, namely “practical reason”, for “practical use”, that could be used to ascribe certain properties to the noumenal realm (Kant 1997:5).  Practical reason could be used to account for those practical realities of our lives that could not be established through pure reason, for example, that humans have the freedom to act rationally.  Kant was of the opinion that such freedom is a practical reality of human lives, forming the basis of our rationality: “The concept of freedom, insofar as its reality is proved by apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason” (Kant 1997:3).  Both the spontaneous activity of our imagination that synthesizes concepts and intuitions, as well as our will, exhibits such freedom.  Although such a concept of freedom falls outside the scope of any knowledge claims (as established through pure reason), the assertion thereof is nevertheless still rationally based.
      
Although the natural law of causality rules out the possibility of freedom in the phenomenal world, there is no reason why it could not be ascribed to the noumenal dimension.  In fact, it is exactly the possible existence of such a dimension that allows us to account for human freedom.  Reath writes in this regard: “Human actions, when considered as noumena, could be regarded as resulting from transcendental freedom … The grounds for ascribing freedom to ourselves come from our recognition of the authority of moral norms, and this ascription is made for practical purposes, as part of our self-conception as rational agents” (Kant 1997:xii/xiii).  This implies that the laws governing the noumenal world could to some extent be indirectly established through practical reason. 

The existence/non-existence of the noumenal realm

There are two possible ways to take the Kantian notion of a noumenal realm existing within the framework of our world in its totality.  One could reject such a possibility.  Until a few decades ago philosophers had no reason to accept such a possibility since there was no empirical reason to postulate it except maybe a moral one (the one Kant used).  In this case one could view Kant as following in the footsteps of Plato who postulated the existence of two worlds, namely one of being (of forms) and one of becoming, which in his later works, especially the Timaeus (Ostenfeld 1982:75), are not too dissimilar to Kant’s worlds of things in themselves (noumena) and things (phenomena).  Together with Plato’s ideas, Kant’s ideas in this regard could then be disregarded as “metaphysics”.     

Even if one rejects the notion of a noumenal realm, one could work with the notion of “transcendental” as referring to that which all people share (i.e. transcendental categories of understanding).  This is the path that many philosophers have followed, especially in analytic and phenomenal philosophy.  In this case, one still has to accept that the structures of the human mind are not fixed and timeless as Kant is supposed to have taken them, but are historically determined.  Many factors influence the non-absolute categories namely habit, history, culture, social class, biology, language, imagination, emotions as well as the unconscious (Tarnas 1991:184). 

In positing a noumenal realm in which the human self is also embedded, Kant connected the subject in a very profound way with the universe in which s/he is situated.  Some philosophers explored this possibility further even though they rejected the possibility of the existence of the noumenal realm: Fichte, Schelling and Hegel suggested that the cognitive categories of the mind were in some sense the ontological categories of the universe (Tarnas 1991:353).  In a way, they still held that the categories are embedded in the cosmic (although not noumenal) structure of the universe.  But as soon as this idea lost influence, the human subject became adrift and no direct contact between the human mind and the intrinsic structure of the universe could be assumed (Tarnas 1991:350).  In this way, the subject became decentered from its position as a basis for knowledge.  The acknowledgement of the impact of the unconscious on all our conscious actions opened the door for the post-modern philosophical perspective.

The noumenal realm as an archetypal world

But what are the implications of an acceptance of the existence of such a noumenal realm?  In this case, one could build on the Kantian foundation.  Instead of reducing the Kantian insights to their bare essentials, one could also explore the possibilities that Kant left untouched, using, for example, new developments in psychoanalysis.  In accordance with Kant’s notion of an archetypal world (natura archetypa) in which the categories of the mind are situated, C. G. Jung developed a very similar idea involving the unconscious.  Paul Kugler writes: “Kant’s categories (time, space, number, and so on) provided the a priori structures necessary for reason itself.  Jung extended the subtle implications of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to the realm of depth psychology, positing archetypes as the a priori categories of the human psyche” (Kugler 2008:86).  He quotes from Jung’s own writings to affirm this:

“One could also describe these forms as categories analogous to the logical categories which are always and everywhere present as the basic postulates of reason.  Only, in the case of our `forms’, we are not dealing with categories of reason but categories of the imagination…  The archetypes are, so to speak, organs of the prerational psyche.  They are eternally inherited forms and ideas which have no specific content.  Their specific content only appears in the course of the individual’s life, when personal experience is taken up in precisely those forms” (Jung 1953-77:517-518).

Richard Tarnas writes in a similar vein: “[A] new focus on the inner workings of the psyche reflected as well an increasingly sophisticated concern with those unconscious structures within the mind of the subject that were determining the ostensible nature of the object – a continuation of the Kantian project on a more comprehensive level… In the course of analyzing a vast range of psychological and cultural phenomena, Jung found evidence of a collective unconscious common to all human beings and structured according to powerful archetypal principles… [J]ung’s granting the status of empirical phenomena to psychological reality was itself a major step past Kant, for he thereby gave substance to ‘internal’ experience as Kant had to ‘external’ experience: all human experience, not just sense impressions, had to be included for a genuinely comprehensive empiricism” (Tarnas 191:383-5).                   

Kant focused only on the conscious mind and then allowed, among all possible non-sensual intuitions, only for intellectual intuitions of noumenal objects.  He did not allow for other non-sensual intuitions that could, for example, be associated with the unconscious part of the mind and which could also be directed towards the noumenal (archetypal) realm.  Furthermore, although Kant refers to the phenomenal/empirical self as distinct from the transcendental self that is associated with the universal structures of the mind, he did maybe not position the personal conscious clearly enough within this collective framework.  Jung did this for the personal and collective unconscious: “[The] personal unconscious rests upon a deeper layer, which does not derive from personal experience and is not a personal acquisition but is inborn.  This deeper layer I call the collective unconscious.  I have chosen this term ‘collective’ because this part of the unconscious is not individual but universal” (Jung 1990:299). 

The “collective” Kantian structures of the mind could be seen in the same way.  They are timeless, not in the sense that they stay the same over time throughout history (as some have wrongly interpreted them), but in the sense that they lay outside the normal time-space framework in the noumenal dimension.  They are also dynamic – allowing for example, for schematization in a contracted or bent space-time framework (in accordance with Einstein’s theories of relativity).  Furthermore, although they themselves do not incorporate a personal component, they underlay the personal component that is situated in both the noumenal and phenomenal realms, and which integrates these. The unconscious part of the mind only influences this personal component of the conscious.  The reason why a community of scientists could reach rational agreement is that they, in spite of the personal component, all share the underlying impersonal, universal, collective structures of understanding.  When the categories of understanding are understood in this way, the validity of human knowledge could maybe be secured.  

The problem with the Jungian concepts is that they have empirical validity only in the psychological sense.  Tarnas writes in this regard: “Depth psychology had perhaps rendered a deeper inner world for modern man, but the objective universe as known by natural science was necessarily opaque, without transcendent dimensions” (Tarnas 1991:367).  But what if the archetypal realm that corresponds with Kant’s noumenal realm does indeed exist?  This could imply that the human mind does in effect have access to this realm, although not in the same way that it has to the phenomenal world.  Kant allowed for this on the intellectual level (albeit not for humans); Jung extended it to the unconscious level.  Kant only allowed for a negative characterization of the noumenal realm, i.e. in a relative way as “that which is the cause or ground of appearances” (Ward 2006:100; Kant 1934:188), but it seems that Jung allows us to also characterize it in a positive way. 

Archetypes are schematized in the form of archetypal images existing in normal space and time.  This could imply that one could get true knowledge (in the form of archetypal images) from the noumenal realm.  Furthermore, if the subject’s mind is embedded in the noumenal realm of the cosmos, s/he is not removed from the world in which s/he is situated.  It is from its groundedness in the noumenal realm that the self accesses the world.

But what reason does one have to postulate the existence of such a noumenal realm?  I propose that this realm should be viewed as nothing but the higher dimensional structure of the cosmos as it is presently theorized in quantum physics.  And it seems to me that we have good reasons to accept this identification.

Relating the noumenal realm to the higher dimensions of theoretical physics

The Polish mathematician Theodor Kaluza was the first to propose (in 1919) that the structure of the universe contains higher dimensions.  (Interesting enough, as with Kant, he was from the University of Köningsberg).  He posited that space dimensions could come in two varieties, namely as large, extended and therefore directly manifested (the normal variety), as well as small and curled up (higher dimensions).  The Swedish mathematician Oskar Klein later refined his work.  They suggested that embedded in the fabric of the universe, at every point thereof, these extra dimensions exist alongside the others (Greene 2000:185-190).

Since the mid-1970’s higher dimensions have become a central part of theoretical studies in physics.  A larger number as well as different shapes have been proposed for such space dimensions.  Even other time dimensions could not be excluded.  In string theory elementary particles are envisioned as tiny strings that vibrate in both large, extended space dimensions as well as in the tiny, curled-up ones.  In fact, the structure of these higher dimensions, its extra-dimensional geometry, determines the fundamental physical attributes like particle masses and charges that is observed in the normal large space dimensions of common experience (Greene 2000:206).  The theoretical physicist Brian Greene writes: “The geometrical form of the extra dimensions plays a critical role in determining resonant patterns of vibration – which appear to us as the masses and charges of elementary particles” (Greene 2000:206 – my accentuation).                          

Now this corresponds remarkably with Kant’s postulate that the noumenal aspect of the cosmos, not only forms the basis and cause of the phenomenal world of observation, but that the phenomena flows from the noumena (Ward 2006:100).  In both cases there is a reference to an inaccessible dimension of our world that forms part of the fabric of the cosmos and which determines what our world of “appearance” looks like (a word Brian Greene also uses!).  Andrew Ward sums up the Kantian view: “[B]y taking the noumenal ground as ultimately responsible for the design of the whole spatio-temporal world, including its physical laws, we can give a purposive explanation for the extraordinary large number of diverse natural forms” (Ward 2006:218).  This is in effect what Greene says.

This brings us to Kant’s proposal that deterministic behaviour is to be associated with the world of phenomena and freedom with the world of noumena.  Is there any reason to accept that freedom (in contrast with determinism) should be associated with the higher dimensions in physics?  Here I would like to refer to the Schrödinger equation, according to which particles like electrons and photons are spread out “in a strange multi-dimensional ‘hyperspace’” (Pine 2006:222).  Some physicists like David Bohm takes this serious as referring to what actually happens (although he views the dimensions differently from string theorists).  When the wave-function “collapses”, the unobserved particle-wave which is somehow located multidimensionally, instantaneously collapse to a single unpredictable point in three-dimensional space.  

What is of interest to us, is that the location/position where the particle will become manifest could not in any way be determined beforehand – it happens in a random manner.  It is only possible to calculate the probability of a particle-wave collapsing at a certain location.  If the particle is in fact situated in part in higher dimensional space as has been proposed, then one could say that the random manifestation thereof in three-dimensional space results from the “freedom” inherent in that dimensions.  This corresponds to some extent with what Kant has said, namely that the free play of our imagination and our free will, as observed in our actions in the phenomenal sphere, originates in the noumenal dimension where the law of freedom reigns. 

As for the imagination, there is some evidence that its ability to produce concrete archetypal images from the dynamic underlying archetypal structures, takes place in a way not too different from what is observed in quantum physics, namely in a random (free) manner, restricted to certain particular outcomes.  Jung, following Kant’s lead (who in his Critique of Judgment made much of the free play of the productive imagination), used a technique that he called “active imagination” to stimulate the mind’s archetypal capabilities.  He writes:

“[I] took up a dream image or an association of the patient’s, and, with this as a point of departure, set him the task of elaborating or developing his theme by giving free reign to his fantasy.  This, according to individual taste and talent, could be done in any number of ways, dramatic, dialectic, visual, acoustic, or in the form of dancing, painting, drawing or modeling.  The result of this technique was a vast number of complicated designs… I was witnessing the spontaneous manifestation of an unconscious process… The chaotic assortment of images that at first confronted me reduced itself in the course of the work to certain well-defined themes and formal elements, which repeated themselves in identical or analogous form with the most varied individuals” (Jung 1990:74/5). 

As for the free will, there is obviously a great difference between the “free” (random) manifestation of particles and a “free” will.  One could, however, propose a very complex interplay of noumena and phenomena, combining freedom and determinism, in the framework of the human mind/brain resulting in humans having a free will.  If this is the case, the freedom manifested in the will is just a much more complex expression of the same basic freedom that is manifest in quantum physics.

The implications for epistemology and ontology

What are the implications for physics, both with regards to epistemology and ontology, if Kant’s noumenal realm corresponds to the higher dimensional structure of the cosmos?  To what extent would one then be able to accommodate developments in quantum physics within the framework of Kantian philosophy?  And what further adaptations to the Kantian perspective could be proposed to bring it in line with quantum physics?  To answer these questions we could first refer to the two well-known interpretations of quantum physics.

The interpretation of the wave-particle duality and how it manifests itself in quantum physics has divided the physics community.  Some physicists, like Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, have formulated the so-called Copenhagen interpretation, according to which observations on the subatomic level present us with a new epistemological discovery, namely that we have reached a barrier in our attempt to describe nature in terms of human concepts derived from ordinary experience (Pine 2006:226).  According to them the descriptions that we normally use to describe nature, like “particle”, “wave”, “position”, “mass” and “spin” involve assumptions about space and time that is not valid on that level.  At most, we could arrive at complementary views of reality. 

This view builds on the philosophical tradition derived from David Hume, according to which the question of what is real is unanswerable (Pine 2006:229).  We could describe the empirical world of observation, but we do not have access to the world as it really is.  Therefore, one should accept that between measurements, when the particle-wave propagates, there is nothing that could be known, i.e. that could be conceptualized in human terms.  Only when the particle is observed, when we could measure it, does it become an object in the true sense of the word.

One could propose that the limit that has been reached is not so much due to the smallness of the particles.  If it was only the smallness of the particles that was the issue, one could always have the expectation that new technology would enable us to overcome such a barrier in extending our observational reach.  But the Copenhagen interpretation clearly refers to a more fundamental barrier.  One could propose that the barrier that has been reached is the higher dimensional structure of the cosmos in which the subatomic particles is (at the very least) partially situated.  This could imply that physicists have experimentally become confronted with things situated in these higher dimensions, that is, with things as they truly are.

If we allow that this higher dimensional structure of the cosmos is the same as the noumenal realm that Kant postulated, then his philosophy is applicable to situations like these.  He said exactly what the Copenhagen interpretation acknowledges, namely that we have no direct experimental access to things situated in this dimension.  Also, in accordance with the “complementary views of reality”, he held that different sets of rules apply in the phenomenal and noumenal realms.                
         
Not all physicists agreed with the Copenhagen interpretation.  Albert Einstein, for example, disagreed.  Einstein rejected the view that a true barrier to knowledge had been reached.  He believed that “There is nothing so far removed from us to be beyond our reach or so hidden that we cannot discover it” (Pine 2006:225).  The human mind would always be able to conceptualize at least the most likely hypothesis about the nature of reality.  Using mathematical models and experimentation, physicists have proposed that we could arrive at a better and better understanding of the hidden forces acting on the subatomic level.  It is exactly in this domain of theoretical physics where the existence of a higher dimensional structure of the cosmos has been proposed.        

This view could also, to some extent, be accommodated in the Kantian perspective if the higher dimensional structure of the cosmos is equated with his noumenal realm.  Kant allowed that we could rationally think and conceptualize this realm.  But according to Kant we cannot arrive at any knowledge of this realm based on pure reason.  Kant, however, did allow us to say something about this realm using “practical reason”. The laws governing the noumenal world could to some extent be indirectly established through practical reason. 

Although Kant only applied practical reason to human freedom (morality), one could propose that it could also be applied to science.  This implies that one could, in spite of what Kant proposed, maybe also positively characterize the noumenal realm in physics (when we equate it with the higher dimensional structure of the universe).  Kant did not foresee that one day we would be able to indirectly access the noumenal realm to the extent that we are presently doing.  And it seems that it is through practical reason (not in the moral sense) that the identification between Kant’s noumenal realm and the higher dimensional structure of the cosmos as it is described in theoretical physics can be established.

Conclusion

It has been more than 200 years since Kant developed his philosophy.  The world has changed a lot.  We have moved beyond the Newtonian view of the world.  Einstein’s theories of relativity and quantum physics have changed our view of the world.  It has been a long time since philosophers have dropped Kant’s notion of a noumenal world existing alongside the phenomenal world.  Could it be true that Kant was right after all?  That his philosophy is not only compatible with our contemporary view of the world, but that the noumenal realm that he postulated is nothing but the higher dimensional structure of our universe that have recently been taken seriously by theoretical scientists? 

In this essay I proposed that this is indeed the case.  After giving a broad overview of the Kantian view, I made some proposals how his philosophy could be adapted (one should rather say extended) to incorporate new developments in psychoanalysis as well as physics. The existence of the noumenal realm opens up the possibility that our knowledge could indeed to some extent be grounded in the human subject, not as standing apart from the world, but as being part of the world.  His philosophy also, not only provides a unified perspective on our world that could incorporate disciplines as far apart as psychoanalysis and physics; it also enables us to reconcile the different interpretations of quantum physics.

If my proposals are accepted, the implications thereof are profound.  It implies that philosophy has taken a wrong turn when it rejected the noumenal realm.  Since this provides the natural ground for knowledge, at least some of what has been done since then leading to the scepticism of post-modernism should be reconsidered.  The adapted Kantian perspective could provide a powerful framework within which the contemporary developments in physics could be interpreted. Lastly, the existence of such a realm reinforces the fact that our world consists of much more than the observable realm.

List of sources

Caygill, Howard. 1995. A Kant Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Greene, B. 2000. The Elegant Universe. London: Random House.
Jung, C. G. 1953-77. Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol 11. Edited by H. Read, Michael Fordham and Gerhard Adler. Translated by R. F. C. Hull. Princeton: Princeton University.
Jung, C. G. 1990. The Basic Writings of C. G. Jung. Translated by R. F. C. Hill. Selected and Introduced by V. S. de Laszlo. Princeton: Princeton University.
Kant, I. 1934. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by J. M. D. Meiklejohn. New York: Everyman’s Library.
Kant, I. 1997. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Mary Gregor. Introduction by Andrews Reath. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Kugler, P. 2008. “Psychic imaging: a bridge between subject and object”, in The Cambridge Companion to Jung (Second Edition). Edited by Polly Young-Eisendrath and Terence Dawson. Cambridge: Cambridge University.
Ostenfeld, E. N. 1982. Forms, Matter and Mind. London: Marinus Nijhoff.
Pine, R. C. 2006. Science and the human prospect. Internet: http//home.Honolulu.Hawaii.edu/pine/book1-2.htm/
Tarnas, R. 1991. The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas that have shaped our worldview. New York: Ballantine.
Ward, A. 2006. Kant. The Three Critiques. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Author: Dr Willie Mc Loud (Ref. wmcloud.blogspot.com)

Read also: 

Kant, Noumena and Quantum Physics
Published in Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 3 (2018)